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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to provide an understanding of the position 
of Betawi women, a Muslim group who are generally lowly educated, come 
from low economic class but live in a metropolitan city with high and 
rapid urbanization, industrialization and modernization. To make this 
study , three aspects of Betawi women's lives have been chosen for 
discussion, viz, education, employment and marriage behaviour.
The research shows that urbanization, industrialization and 
modernization in Jakarta have not automatically improved the position 
of Betawi women as postulated by many authors. It reveals that there 
is no direct correlation between the stage of economic development or 
industrialization, women's economic participation and the availability 
of higher education for women. This study concludes that since 
industrialization and modernization have not changed the education of 
the Betawi dramatically , the factor which is generally considered to 
be of most importance in influencing the position of women, Betawi 
attitudes toward working women and marriage behaviour have also not 
changed. On the other hand, some changes in patterns of social 
interaction of the sexes before marriage that do not improve the 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 Employment, Education and Marriage Customs as Factors 
Influencing the Position of Women : A Review of Literature
The Betawi are the native people of Jakarta. They are the 
descendants of the early settlers of Batavia ( the name for Jakarta 
before Indonesian Independence), from which the word Betawi is 
derived. In general terms, they are poorly educated, are strict 
adherents of Islam, but they live on the fringes of a large metropolis 
(Castles, 1967; Dhofier, 1976; Koentjaraningrat, 1976; Probonegoro, 
1974; Santoso, 1964; Yusuf, 1974). This review of literature, 
therefore, focuses on the aspects of the position of women most 
relevant to the situation of the Betawi. The study discusses 'the 
position of women' rather then their 'status' or 'role' in order to 
better accommodate the general concept of a woman's situation in daily 
life; the other terms are more likely to imply role expectation or 
legal status (Hull, 1975). Even though the author often compares the 
Betawi women with Betawi men or with other women, these comparisons do 
not represent comparisons of status since they do not show a hierarchy 
based on values ascribed by the society itself. The aim of these 
comparisons is simply to indicate the relative level of Betawi women 
in terms of measures of education, employment and marriage behaviour. 
For example, the level of education of Betawi women will be examined 
over time and in comparison with other groups. Observed improvements 
for Betawi women can be regarded as improvements in their position,
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but the impact of improvement in education on status in society is not 
necessarily commensurate as this would depend on the value ascribed to 
education by the society. If wealth or ancestry are the principal 
determinants of status, then a major improvement in education may have 
only a minor impact on a person's social status, at least in the short 
term. On the other hand, as will be evident from the literature 
review, education, employment outside the family circle, and greater 
freedom and power in the marriage relationship have often been 
considered to be important elements in the improvement of women's 
status in society.
1.1.1 Employment
Some studies show that the expanding job opportunities afforded 
by urbanization and industrialization have contributed to women’s 
employment participation (OECD, 1975)* On the other hand, other 
studies reveal that there does not appear to be a correlation between 
the level of economic development and the degree of industrialization 
and women's economic participation (Smock, 1977)* Obviously women's 
economic opportunities are related to a variety of factors as noted by 
a meeting of experts in New York (OECD 1975)* The importance of each 
factor varies between countries.
Related to the participation of women in the labour force, Blood 
and Wolf (i960) have developed a theory concerning employment and the 
position of women which they call "Marital Power and Resources", as a 
basis for analysis of the factors which determine husband - wife
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interaction. They found that education, occupation, and income 
influenced the husband-wife relationship; these factors were treated 
as resources which one was able to use within the marital relationship 
in order to gain greater decision making power. In order to measure 
the precise balance of power between husband and wife, eight questions 
were asked. They found that the average power score generally 
increased with increase in the husband's education, income and 
occupational status. They stated:
"It is desirable to compare the wife and husband on the same 
characteristic , for then the comparative resourcefulness 
and competence of the two partners can be discovered. Once 
we know which partner has more education, higher status 
background etc we will know who tends to make most of the 
decisions" (Blood and Wolf, 1960:37).
Several studies have examined marital power in relation to the 
wife’s working status. The findings in most of these studies indicate 
that working wives have more marital power than non-working wives. 
This is reported for Germany by Lamouse (1969) and Lupri (1969); for 
Greece by Safillios Rotschild (1967); for the United States by Heer 
(1963)» Blood and Wolf (1960) and Papanek (1969); for France by 
Michel (1967); for Denmark by Kendell and Lesser (1971); for Puerto 
Rico by Weller (1968). It exists not only in the developed countries, 
but also in developing countries such as in Ghana (Oppong, 1970). It 
is interesting to quote Oppong's finding that a woman's employment is 
more important than her education and social status in determining her 
position.
So far, there are no studies of the relationship between women's 
work and their marital power for Indonesia. There are many studies of 
women in Indonesia which use employment as one of the indicators of
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the position of women, but these studies do not investigate the 
relation of working status to marital power.
In discussing the position of women from the point of view of the 
relationship between employment status and marital power, it is also 
important to look at the society's attitude toward working women, 
since it has been found in many countries that this factor is crucial 
to women entering employment .
1.1.2 Education
The other conventional factor used to indicate the position of 
women is education. It is a critical factor in the improvement of the 
position of women as it is indispensible for many of the modern roles. 
Education equips women with the knowledge and expertise necessary for 
playing many modern roles and thereby enables them to compare their 
position in society vis-a-vis men. It was shown by Blood and Wolf 
(i960) that at the family level , wife's education was one of the 
factors determining the husband-wife relationship. The conclusion is 
clear that husbands continue to gain power if they exceed the wife's 
education, and to lose it if they fall short of the wife's education.
Since the Betawi are a Muslim society , it is interesting to 
refer to Menon's opinions about the education of Muslim women in India 
(Menon, 1979)* She says the backwardness of education of Muslim women 
is due to four factors. First, there is an insistance on religious 
education, which is regarded as being indispensable for a Muslim, and
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this leads to late entry to secular school. Second, after entering 
school at a later age, a Muslim woman will be forced to discontinue 
her study when she attains puberty as she then is not allowed to go 
out freely . This means she will remain in school only for a short 
time, reaching only the third or fourth standard. Third, the practice 
of early marriage, widely prevalent in the Muslim community, is found 
to be another factor preventing women from continuing their education. 
Fourth, women are not expected to go out to work and earn but to 
remain at home looking after their husband and children.
It can be concluded from Menon's description that early age at 
marriage is one of the factors influencing the backwardness in 
education of Muslim women, but at the same time, education is one of 
the causes of increased age at first marriage. In any case, the 
two-way relationship between education and age at first marriage is an 
important factor influencing the position of women.
1.1.3 Marriage Customs
The third factor indicating the position of women is customary 
behaviour related to marriage, such as mate selection, divorce, 
remarriage and polygyny. Korson (1969) hypothesized that if one were 
to predict the source of change from the norms of a society, one would 
look to the younger generations to initiate such change in an area 
that so vitally affects them, viz, mate selection.
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There are at least two reasons to use mate selection to indicate 
the position of women. First, although change in some areas of social 
life occurs more readily and with less resistance than in others, next 
to religion the institution of the family is the slowest to change, 
and traditional norms are more apt to be defended by the older 
generation. Second, the traditional pattern does not provide any 
opportunity for the prospective spouses to participate in decision 
making in respect of their own marriage. Therefore, by looking at 
freedom of mate selection we can have an idea whether there are any 
changes in the position of young people especially the position of 
women since men are often freer in the mate selection process, as in 
Turkey (Timur, 1978), and Malaysia (Che 
Mat, 1979/80; Muhammad, 1979; Zallaluddin, 1979/80).
Rao's study in India revealed that high education was considered 
to be a major differentiating factor in the attitude of respondents 
toward arranged marriage. The same result had been obtained from 
eight previous research projects (Rao, 1979)* However, it is 
interesting to note that research conducted in Thailand showed that 
education is not as strong a factor in influencing attitudes toward 
mate selection as might have been expected. Neither in rural nor in 
urban areas are differences found by education (Limanonda, 1979)* In 
this case, there must have been another factor, other than education, 
influencing the attitude toward mate selection.
Marsh and O'Hara (1961-62) noted that absence of institutional 
arrangements for dating and courtship affect the attitude toward mate 
selection. This statement has been supported by Podmore and Chaney 
(1979) who made a comparative study between Hong Kong and Taiwanese
Page 7
students. A very much higher proportion of Hong Kong respondents (94 
percent) than Taiwanese (58 percent) expected to be able to choose 
their spouse independently. This wide gap can be interpreted as being 
due basically to the more traditional family life in Taiwan compared 
to the more westernized way of life in Hong Kong. Dating and 
courtship are rarely found in Taiwan, thus free choice is difficult. 
In Hong Kong there are many institutionalised ways in which the sexes 
mingle freely, not only in school but also in government sponsored 
dances, youth camps and community centres. Marsh and O' Hara give the 
impression that attitudes toward mate selection are influenced by the 
means provided for selection. It is more likely, however, as Kurian 
has stated that the changing of attitudes toward mate selection is 
followed by provision of the means to convert the new attitudes into 
reality (Kurian, 1979)* Whereas this discussion focuses on the 
physical means, Karlson has argued in terms of values; he said that 
where societies value the group or the family first and individual 
satisfaction second, mate selection will be in the hands of the 
elders. In individualistic societies, people will make their own 
choice of spouse (cited from Limanonda, 1979)*
In connection with employment and education , El Hamamsy (1959) 
was of the opinion that women in Egypt had gained their right to 
education and to gainful employment as well as the right to vote and 
to hold political office. However, there still remained some 
important aspects of their legal status - those relating to marriage - 
which needed revision. It was stated in the 'Middle East Seminar on 
Population Policy' that Islamic divorce laws, which discriminate 
against women, are the prime target for those seeking to improve the 
condition of women in Muslim countries (National Academy of Science,
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1974)* But it is noteworthy that the path of reform is not an easy 
one because matters relating to women's status have, to a large 
extent, either been legislated by the Qur'an, which believing Muslims 
regard as the literal word of God as revealed to the Prophet, or by 
subsequent legislation derived from interpretation of the Qur'an and 
the traditional sayings of the Prophet (Keddie and Beck, 1978:25)*
Even though Islamic laws and attitudes regarding the status of 
women have come in for much criticism, Jones is much more careful 
about claims that Islam is the independent cause of divorce (Jones, 
n.d*). He points out that Islamic areas with a high divorce rate are 
those which are least developed economically and educationally. He 
continues that the divorce rate in Egypt and Iran is much lower than 
in Kelantan, Trengganu and Java (three areas which have high divorce 
rates but also have less economic development and lower education).
Related to this statement above, Jones in a different publication 
(1980) points out that by 1975 the divorce rate among European and 
European-derived populations had doubled since I960, whereas the 
divorce rate among Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia had dropped to 
one third or less of their 1960 figure over the same period. The 
divorce rates among West Malaysian Malays and Indonesian Muslims were 
already lower in 1975 than those in the United States, USSR or England 
and Wales (Jones, 1980). In making this comparison, he warned that 
the crude divorce rate overstated the rate of divorce among the 
eligible (currently married) population in western countries as 
compared with the Malay population because the denominator in the 
Malay populations included a much higher proportion of children. It 
seems that women's participation in paid employment is one of the
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factors which has increased the divorce rate in Western countries, 
whilst the economic dependence of wives in the modern sector in Malaya 
sustains lower divorce rates. Also the social acceptability of 
divorce might have had an effect. In Malaya divorce is considered 
less acceptable than before, whilst the reverse is true in the west.
It may be that women's workforce participation is one of the
factors affecting the increase of the divorce rate in western
countries. Hart (1976:101) based on research of divorce in Britain,
has said :
"My own preference, however, is to assign paramount 
significance to the cluster of variables associated with the 
changing division of labour between sexes. It is my 
contention that rising female participation rates and 
increasing state intervention in the economy of the 
household are the most important causes of growing divorce 
rates in Britain over the last few decades."
So women's workforce participation has increased their power 
within marriage on the one hand but it has also increased the divorce 
rate on the other hand. Women's participation in the labour force 
brings men and women into interaction and contact with the other sex 
outside the family; this may lead to conflict in the family. This 
situation can also be explained by Heer's theory which states that the 
bigger the difference between the resources of the husband and wife, 
the more reluctant the wife will be to seek a divorce from her husband 
(Heer, 1963). The same findings have also been noted by Geertz 
(i960), Hull (1975) and Firth (1966). In this regard , Palmer has 
given the warning that a couple who feels that it is economically 
necessary for the wife to work should consider the effect that this 
has on their total relationship (Palmer, 1979).
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Another aspect of women's position in Muslim society is polygyny. 
Related to this Ware (n.d:2l) has made the interesting statement that:
"It is equally true that there is no simple relationship 
between polygyny, or even polyandry and the status of women. 
Societies which practice polygyny are often presented as 
attaching little value to women but it would be at least 
equally valid to turn the argument on its head and say that 
they place little value upon men. Where women cooperate 
rather than compete then polygyny has a great deal to offer 
women : constant companionship, child care always at hand, 
the sharing of domestic burdens and considerable degree of 
independence and autonomy. A woman who only spends one week 
in four being a wife has considerably more free time to 
devote to her own interest."
It seems that Ware's statement is based on her experience among 
the Yoruba of Nigeria (Ware, 1979)* Even though her statement sounds 
extreme, at least she has warned that polygyny related to the position 
of women has to be interpreted cautiously. It is well known that in a 
polygynous society the merits and disadvantages of abolishing polygyny 
are often hotly debated, with the western educated elite commonly 
failing to convince the mass of women that the practice should be 
abandoned. For example, one member of the Muslim Womens Party in 
Indonesia disagreed with the abolition of polygyny in Indonesia 
(Soewondo, 1955) while at the same time the rest of the women's party 
called for polygyny to be abolished. Also during the debate of a new 
marriage law, a representative of the Indonesian Womens’ Congress 
claimed that polygyny should be legal to allow for the case of women 
who cannot bear children, since having children is one of the 
'remedies' to harmonize the home. She also argued that polygyny was 
necessary since men are polygamous by nature and she referred to the 
practice of keeping mistresses (Hull, 1975).
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The case against polygyny is based primarily on its use as a 
status symbol , an occurrence found especially among the elite. It is 
this practice which the movement has been fighting against claiming 
that it is inspired entirely by the passion of men and is nothing more 
than disguised prostitution (quotes from early debates on marriage 
legislation cited by Vreede de Stuers, 1960:105)«
From the discussion above, we can conclude that there are 
different opinions about polygyny, with attitudes differing between 
societies and from one group to another within a society.
As with divorce, many authors claim that Islam is the reason for 
high rates of polygyny since Islam allows a man to have up to four 
wives, but again, as with divorce we have to interpret the data on 
polygyny cautiously. Peel has claimed that religious prohibitions 
have a limited effect in a culture where polygyny is widely accepted 
(cited from Ware, 1979:186). In reverse, therefore, even where 
religion provides for polygyny, the incidence of polygyny is still 
likely to be low in societies which are culturally monogamous.
Finally, most studies have shown that education is the most 
powerful force operating against polygyny, along with modernization, 
westernization and urbanization (Ware, 1979; Momeni, 1975)«
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1.1.4 The impact of modernization, industrialization and 
urbanization on women's position
It is generally assumed that there is an automatic relationship 
between economic development and the progress of women, that is it is 
believed that if a country is better off then the women must also be 
in a commensurately better position (Evans-Pritchard, 1965; 
McCord and A. McCord, 1977; Newcomb, 1967; Ross, 1961). This,
however, is not always the case. It is said for example, that where 
women have traditionally occupied a relatively high position, the 
social changes accompanying modernization may in the long run 
undermine their position in the family and even more so reduce their 
economic options (Boserup, 1970; Bhatty, 1975;
Halpern, 1979; Schöffel, 1979; Stoller, 1977; Ulrich, 1977).
Findings in other countries, however, show that modernization has 
brought women into the public sphere for productive work, but after 
work hours, the public/domestic dichotomy reappears in the allocation 
of the sexes into the different spheres
(Denich, 1977; Hamamsy, 1959; Hull, 1975; Mintz, 1971; Smock, 1977 a).
According to Ware (1981:20), the belief that a woman's position 
automatically improved with modernization is based on the opinion that 
the position of women in traditional societies is very bad indeed 
This assumption follows from the fact that industrialization and 
modernization give women a better education, higher participation in 
modern sector jobs and a better position in family affairs, such as 
marriage and decision making. But the rate of improvement in these 
three factors is often higher for men than for women so that the
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relative position of women deteriorates. Also an improvement in one 
sector, say education, does not guarantee an automatic improvement in 
other sectors such as employment participation and the family role. 
Ware (1981:20) in her study of women, demography and development 
listed some of the issues which have been raised in the debate over 
whether development has had an impact upon the status of women. This 
implies that the idea of an automatic relationship between development 
and the position of women is now very much under attack. The effect 
of development clearly must depend upon the original position of women 
in traditional society prior to the impact of outside influences. If 
in traditional society wives had no recognized economic role and no 
legal rights which they could use to protect their position, then 
development could not deprive them of advantages which they did not 
possess. Where women were generally little more than slaves, 
development and any other change was likely to bring some relief (Ware 
1981 : 19). The historical experience of women in Ghana, however, 
indicates that the original position of women is not the only factor 
to be considered. We need also to take into account what the original 
position was based on, religion or custom; the response of both men 
and women to the new influences; whether the new influences are in 
conflict with th§ traditional position of women. In short, there is 
no simple relationship between modernization and the position of 
women; modernization and industrialization need not automatically 
improve women's position.
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1.2 Objectives of the Study
It is well known that education is one of the most important 
factors in the position of women, yet it is often claimed in Muslim 
countries that even where there is a good opportunity for the 
education of women, their position is still poor with respect to 
marriage behaviour. In addition education, urbanization and 
modernization are recognized as factors which play a role in the 
position of women. It is interesting, therefore, to consider the 
position of Betawi women since they are poorly educated and strict 
Muslims while on the other hand they live in a metropolitan city, a 
highly urbanized environment with rapid modernization.
Since Betawi women are generally poorly educated, the homogeneity 
of the population is an obstacle to the analysis of differences in the 
position of women according to their education level. The same 
problem applies to differences by employment, since there are very few 
Betawi women who work outside of the family circle. The position of 
the Betawi women in respect of education and employment is best 
considered, therefore, in aggregate terms, that is, by comparing the 
Betawi women as a group to other groups such as Betawi men, other 
women in Jakarta and women in other parts of Indonesia. Nevertheless, 
where possible, attempts should be made to analyse differences within 
the group of Betawi women, most importantly, differences by generation 
and marital status.
This study attempts to find the answers to the following 
questions :
- Based on experience in some Muslim countries, the position of women
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in terms of education and employment is better than their position 
in respect of marriage behaviour. Does this situation also apply to 
the Betawi women?
What is the extent of social change in the position of Betawi women 
between generations given the rapid modernization in Jakarta?
What is the position of Betawi women relative to women at the 
national level?
1.3 Framework of Analysis
The three factors which have been chosen to describe the 
position of women are education, employment and marriage customs. 
These aspects will be divided into facts and attitudes and analysed 
by comparing the Betawi women to the Betawi men, the older 
generation of women to the younger, and where possible, by comparing 
the Betawi women to other women in Jakarta and/or Indonesia.
To consider whether their position in education and employment 
has altered more then their position in marriage, contemporary 
differences between the sexes and the extent of social change will 
be used. The operational definitions used to measure education, 
employment, and marriage customs are as follows:
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EDUCATION
a. Level of formal education
- what is the level of formal education of the Betawi women 
compared to the Betawi men and other women in Jakarta?
- what is the trend of education of the Betawi women compared to 
the trend for men and other women in Jakarta?
- what is the trend of difference in education between Betawi 
women and Betawi men compared to the trend of differences 
between other men and women in Jakarta?
b. Informal education
- what is the frequency of utilization of informal education 
media such as newspapers, magazines, radio and television?
c. General knowledge
- what is the general knowledge of the marriage law, that is, 
a type of general knowledge related to their position?
d. Prospects of education
Information to be investigated includes the reasons for drop out 
from school; attitudes toward education; the opportunities 
provided (by government) for education and other 
variables which indirectly affect education.
EMPLOYMENT
a. Function in the economy
Based on the theory of "Marital Power and Resources" which 
states that more resources mean more power, it is important
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to examine the women's role in income generation.
b. Kind of job
Since employment means a chance to communicate with other people 
and to improve knowledge, it is important to consider whether 
women work in jobs which allow them to go outside the 
family circle or in jobs which cause them to stay at home 
(home industry).
c. Attitudes toward working women
There are two reasons for looking at attitudes toward working 
women. First, sometimes there is a contradiction between fact 
and attitudes, for example, if attitudes towards work are not 
supported by opportunities to work, it would be misleading 
to base the analysis on fact only. Second, attitudes are 
an indicator of prospects for social change.
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY POSITION
a. Mate selection
This is one of the indicators of individual rights. The discusion 
will cover :
- The women's role in mate selection
- attitudes toward mate selection
- social change in mate selection
b. Social interaction with the opposite sex
Mate selection is influenced by the extent of social interaction 
with single person of the opposite sex. The discusion will
cover :
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- the opportunities for mixing
- frequency of mixing
- opinions about mixing
- social change in courtship
c. Age at first marriage
This variable is very important in discussing the position of 
women since the termination of education is often associated 
with early marriage. The discussion will cover :
- the level of age at first marriage among the Betawi women
- attitudes toward child and late marriage
d. The stereotype of married women
- women as house wives
- the reproduction function
- the inferior position of women
e. The rights of women
- husband's dominance of his wife
- kind of divorce , whether women has right to divorce or not
- causes of divorce
- attitudes toward divorce and polygyny
- mate selection and courting prior to remarriage
1.4 Data Sources
This thesis is based primarily on a marriage survey which was
conducted in 1978 by the Demographic Institute of the University of
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Indonesia *). The research location was the sub-villages of 
Balekambang and Batu Ampar in the Condet area.
Jakarta is divided into five Wilayah, namely Northern Jakarta, 
Western Jakarta, Southern Jakarta, Eastern Jakarta and Central 
Jakarta. Each wilayah is divided into Kecamatan which in turn are 
divided into Kelurahan. The survey area, called kelurahan 
Balekambang lies in the Condet area, kecamatan Keramat Djati, 
Eastern Jakarta. In 1975 Condet was designated as 
Daerah Cagar Budaya Betawi (Betawi Cultural Reservation) by the 
Governor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin. The reason for this decision was 
that 90 percent of the people are Betawi who physically and 
culturally represent the Betawi Tempo Doeloe (original Betawi). The 
same reason was used in choosing kelurahan Balekambang as the survey 
area. Eighty four percent of this area (159 ha) is agricultural, 
and the rest is residential. Communication with the city by public 
transport is easy. Even though a village environment is predominant 
here, city life can be reached in less than ten minutes drive.
From the chosen village, two sub-villages were drawn. These 
were chosen purposely so as to maximize the proportion of Betawi 
households. All Betawi households in this area were visited. The 
respondents were ever married couples 60 years old and under; but
*) This marriage survey was conducted under the direction of P.F. 
McDonald of the Demography Department, The Australian National 
University. The author acknowledges with thanks his generosity in 
making this data available. A general report on the Betawi 
survey is given in Sutarsih Muliakusuma : PERKAWINAN DAN 
PERCERAIAN PADA MASYARAKAT BETAWI : SUATU STUDI KASUS DI DESA 
BALEKAMBANG, JAKARTA (Marriage and Divorce among the Betawi : A
Case Stdy in Balekambang Village, Jakarta) PPSK UGM Yogyakarta,
1982.
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when only one spouse was aged 60 and under, the other spouse was 
also interviewed. In total, there were 507 ever married-females and 
430 ever married-males interviewed. The male proportion was lower 
because about 20 percent of female respondents were widowed or 
divorced. Besides the ever married respondents, 101 single males 
and 105 single females from the same households were also 
interviewed.
The questionaires used in the interviews covered marriage 
behaviour such as age at first marriage, the arrangement of 
marriage, marriage ceremonies, polygyny, divorce, remarriage, 
education and employment. A huge amount of information was 
collected consisting of fact, attitude and opinion. Four types of 
questionaire were used; type A for ever married males, type B for 
ever married females, type C for single males and type D for single 
females.
The same survey was also conducted in seven other provinces in 
Indonesia, viz, Aceh, South Sumatra, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, 
South Kalimantan, Bali and Jogjakarta.
Comparative data will be obtained from the 1971 census. These 
census data are derived from census tapes held by the Department of 
Demography, the Australian National University.
As these sources are somewhat limited in their treatment of the 
position of women, this often limits the author in making her 
arguments. In this case, the author has drawn upon her personal 
knowledge of the Betawi based on her experience of living among them 
throughout her life. This method has some weaknesses, indeed, but
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in circumstances where there is no alternative source of 
information, it is useful if only to provide hypotheses to be 
examined in future research.
It should be noted that the Betawi mentioned in this survey 
refer only to the Betawi in Condet and do not necessarily represent 
other Betawi in other parts of Jakarta or the Betawi in some parts 
of West Java (see p.19 paragraph 2). There is no indication whether 
the Betawi who live in different places have the same socio cultural 
background and, as described above, the survey area was chosen by 
purposive sampling.
CHAPTER II
T H E  B E T A W I  B A C K G R O U N D
II.1 Historical Background (1)
The recorded history of the Betawi began in 1619 when the Dutch 
set up their chief base operation in a sparsely settled area in West 
Java called Batavia —  from which the word Betawi is derived —  by 
moving slaves from outer and east Indonesia and by supporting the 
migration of free settlers. The free settlers were Chinese, Moors 
(South India Muslims), Malays, Balinese, Ambonese and Japanese. These 
free settlers, however, were outnumbered by slaves (see Table II.1). 
At first the slaves were brought from the mainland of South Asia -- 
from the Coromandel Coast, Malabar, Bengal and from Arakan in Burma; 
but after the East India Company gave up its foothold in Arakan 
(1665), the Archipelago itself became the main source of slaves. At 
various times, Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores, Timor, Nias, Kalimantan and 
Pampanga in Luzon made their contribution; but the most important 
sources were Bali and South Sulawesi (for location of these islands 
see figure II.1 ).
The free settlers were overhelmingly male while the reverse was 
the case among the slaves and this encouraged amalgamation of the two 
groups. As a result by the end of the 19th century, the diverse 
Indonesian ethnic groups had lost their separate identity in a new
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Source: Castles, L., 1961:157.
In view of inadequate statistical records in earlier times, figures 
are not precise. But they do serve to show roughly the proportions 
of the different ethnic groups.
Page 24




D i s t r i c t g r e n s  : 1. B a la r a d ja
2. Mauk
3. Tanggerang 
4* B a ta v ia  
5. W eltevreden
REGENTSCIIAP IvlEESTER CORNELIS
D i s t r i c t g r e n s  : 6 . K ebajoran
7 . M eester  C o rn e l is
8 .  B ekas i
9. T j ik a ra n g
REGENTSCHAP BUITENZORG
10. T j ib a r u s a
11. T j ib in o n g
12. Parung
13. B u iten zo rg
14. L euw iliang
15. D ja s in g a
Source : Tideman, 19335141
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ethnic group that of the Betawi (see table II.1 column 2 and 3)- This 
new ethnic-group was recognized formally by the establishment of the 
Betawi Association in 1923 by Muhamad Husni Thamrin. It is 
interesting that genetically the Betawi came mainly from the eastern 
part of the archipelago but in contrast the powerful cultural 
solvents, Islam and the Malay language, came from the west.
Even though the Betawi are known as the native people of Jakarta, 
in fact they can be found not only in Jakarta, but also in the 
hinterland of Jakarta, viz, Tanggerang, Bogor and Bekasi (2). This 
situation can be traced by looking backward to the government 
administration system during the Dutch occupation. It was stated in 
staatsblad 1931 number 425 (Tideman, 1933:140) that Batavia was one 
'keresidenan' which was divided into three 'kabupaten', namely, 
Batavia, Meester Cornelis and Buitenzorg. Each kabupaten was divided 
into ’kewedanaan' as shown in Figure II.1. The shaded area of this 
figure was known as Batavia Meester-Cornelis and is now known as 
Jakarta Raya. Both the shaded and clear areas were known as Batavia 
and are now known as Jakarta and environs whilst the clear area itself 
is now part of the province of West Java. In the following 
discussion, the focus is upon the Betawi in Jakarta Raya.
During the early settlement, the various ethnic groups shown in 
table II.1, generally lived in their special quarters as shown in 
figure II.2. It appears that most of the ancestors of the Betawi in 
old Jakarta lived in an urban situation but at the beginning of the
(2) Probonegoro, for example, in conducting research about lenong
the Betawi folk drama —  chose two villages, in Bekasi and 
Tanggerang, where almost one hundred percent of the people were 
Betawi (Probonegoro, 1974).
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J a k a r t a ,  sno.ving m u n ic ip a l o o u nuaries  and s u b d i s t r i c t s
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Note : The shaded a re a  was annexed to  J a k a r t a  in  195o.
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Sources : Adapted irom  C a s t l e s , !  : 16o and 163.
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twentieth century there were great waves of new migrants, so more and 
more Betawi moved out of the urbanized areas. The 1930 Census showed 
that the Betawi were the dominant ethnic group in the fringe area, the 
shaded area in Figure II.2 (see table II.2).
The high migration rates have ' created housing problems in 
Jakarta. In order to overcome the accommodation shortage, the city 
has been expanding into the fringes of Jakarta, the main purpose being 
to ease the density of the population in the centre of the city . 
Indeed, urbanization of the fringe area of Jakarta where most of the 
Betawi live has been the major part of the urban expansion of Jakarta. 
For example, in 1930 in Kebayoran there were 143*221 Betawi out of a 
total population of 145505 (98 percent). As is shown in table II.3, 
though the Betawi are the native people of Jakarta, by 1961 they were 
a minority compared to the Javanese and the Sundanese, the two major 
ethnic groups in Java. The Sundanese and Javanese increased through 
post independence migration to Jakarta. Also in the elite strata, the 
Betawi are practically non-existent and the dominance of the Javanese 
is apparent (Table II.4). So far, there have been only two Betawi who 
were regarded as members of the elite : Muhamad Husni Thamrin, the 
founder of the Betawi Association and Syafii, the Minister of Defence
in 1965*
Table II.2





A + B  
Dj akarta £Djakarta
Mr Cornelis Area Raya § environs
(Census) (Estimate) (Estimate) (Census)
Indigenous
Batavians* 192,897 226,000 418,900 778,953
Sundanese 135,251 15,000 150,300 494,547
Javanese 58,708 1,000 59,700 142,563
Malays 5,220 100 5,300 8,295
North Sulawesi groups 3,736 100 3,800 3,821
Minangkabau 3,186 - 3,200 3,204
Maluku groups 2,034 - 2,000 2,065
Batak 1,253 - 1,300 1,263
Depok and Tugu people 721 200 900 998
South Sumatra groups 799 - 800 817
Madurese 317 - 300 393
Other and unknown 5,553 1,400 6,900 7,063
Subtotal 409,665 243,800 653,400 1.,443,517
Non-indigenous
Chinese 78,185 9,400 88,200 136,829
Europeans 37,076 100 37,200 37,504
Others 7,469 400 7,900 8,248
Total 533,015 253,800 786,800 1,636,098
Note*----‘ A Batavia-Mr Cornelis is the clear area in Figure II.2
B Fringe area is the shaded area in Figure II.2
A+B Djakarta Raya is Figure II.2 or shaded area in Figure II.1 
Djakarta and environs is Figure II.1 (shaded + clear area)
Source: Castles, 1967:159.
★
Batavians is the name used for Betawi prior to Independence.
Table II.3
Estimated Population of Jakarta by Ethnic Groups, 1961
Number Per Cent
Indigenous
Batavians (Djakarta Asli)* 655,400 22.9
Sundanese 952,500 32.8
Javanese and Madurese 737,700 25.4
At j ehnese 5,200 0.2
Batak 28,900 1.0
Minangkabau 60,100 2.1
South Sumatra groups 34,900 1.2
Bandj arese 4,800 0.2
South Sulawesi groups 17,200 0.6
North Sulawesi groups 21,000 0.7
Maluku and Irian groups 11,800 0.4
East Nusatenggara groups 4,800 0.2
West Nusatenggara groups 1,300 0.0
Balinese 1,900 0.1
Malays and other Outer Island groups 19,800 0.7
Unknown/non-indigenous 349,100 12.0
Total Population 2,906,500 100.0
Source: Castles, L., 1967:185.
* Batavians is the name used for Betawi prior to Independence.
Table II.4
Ethnic Proportions of Elite Groups Compared With the 














Batavians 23.0 - - 0.5
Sudanese 33.0 (12.0) (11.0) 11.0
Javanese-Madurese 25.5 51.0 58.0 62.0
Outer Island peoples 7.5 26.0 29.5 17.5
Chinese 10.0 3.0 1.5 1.5
Other non-indigenous 0.5 1.0 - -
Unknown 1.5 7.0 - 7.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N = 146 61 225
Source: Castles, 1967:201.
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I I . 2 S o c i a l  Background
S i n c e  many o f  the  newcomers i n  the  f r i n g e  a r e a s  a r e  w e a l th y  and 
e d u c a t e d  p e o p l e ,  t h e r e  i s  a c o n t r a s t  i n  s t y l e  o f  l i f e  and h o u s in g  
be tw een  th e  Betawi and the  newcomers .  D h o f i e r  (1976)  found t h a t  t h i s  
e x p a n s i o n  has  r e s u l t e d  i n  f r i c t i o n  be tween  t h e  two g r o u p s ,  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  e t h n i c  f e e l i n g  and s o l i d a r i t y  among th e  Betawi and a l s o  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s  a c t i v i t y .  They a r e  t h u s  more aware t h a t  
t h e i r  group  d i f f e r s  from the  newcomers who a r e  g e n e r a l l y  n o t  s t r i c t  
Musl ims o r  a r e  C h r i s t i a n s .  T h i s  h a s  a l s o  l e d  to  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  r e l i g i o u s  l e a d e r s  ( 3 ) .  The Betawi and newcomers 
now l i v e  as  n e ig h b o u r s  bu t  o n l y  i n  t h e  p h y s i c a l  s e n s e ,  s o c i a l l y  t h e y  
a r e  f a r  a p a r t .
The r e s i d e n c e  p a t t e r n s  o f  t h e  Betawi  a r e  g e n e a l o g i c a l ,  which 
means t h a t  some o f  t h e i r  n e i g h b o u r s  a r e  a l s o  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e s .  T h i s  i s  
c aused  by t h e i r  custom o f  g r a n t i n g  l and  i n  t h e  form o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  to  
t h e i r  m a r r i e d  c h i l d r e n  to  b u i l d  t h e i r  h o u s e s .  The o t h e r  c a u s e  i s  
t h e i r  low m i g r a t i o n  r a t e .  Most Be tawi l i v e  i n  t h e  p l a c e  where t h e y  
were born  ( 4 ) .  I n d i v i d u a l s  n e v e r  t r a v e l  f a r  f rom t h e i r  p l a c e  o f  
b i r t h .
(3 )  D h o f i e r  (1976)  showed t h a t  the  i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  r e l i g i o u s  
a c t i v i t y  s t a r t e d  no t  more t h a n  two decades  ago ,  t h a t  i s ,  a t  t h e  
b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  new c o m e r ' s  movement.
( 4 ) A s t u d y  conduc ted  by K o e n t j a r a n i n g r a t , f o r  example,  showed t h a t  70 
p e r c e n t  o f  h i s  r e s p o n d e n t s  remained  i n  t h e i r  p l a c e  o f  b i r t h  
( K o e n t j a r a n i n g r a t , 19 7 5 :1 5 ) ;  w h i l s t  D h o f i e r ' s  s t u d y  showed t h a t  
t h e  Betawi a r e  v e r y  immobile ( D h o f i e r ,  1 9 7 6 :4 4 ) .
Page 32
Most of the Betawi work as fruit farmers, dairy farmers, or fruit 
sellers (5)* A few become religious teachers and very few work as 
government employees. This is not only because they are immobile but 
also because of their poor education (6).
Almost all social scientists who have conducted research among 
the Betawi have confirmed that the Betawi are religious people 
(Dhofier, 1976; Koentjaraningrat, 1975; Guinness, 1972; Santoso, 
1967; Yusuf, 1974), meaning that they adhere more strictly to Islam
than the other ethnic groups in Jakarta or compared with their
neighbours. Even so, Probonegoro (1974) referred to some Betawi as 
non-religious people. The non-religious people mentioned by
Probonegoro were the folk drama group but generally the Betawi are
strict Muslims. As a result, the madrasah (Islamic school) still has 
a place besides the government schools since some of the older 
generation still consider secular education to be a first step toward 
Christianization (7)- Yet more and more Betawi go to government 
schools since the government is striving to alter the situation by 
founding government schools rather than religious schools and by 
changing the curriculum in religious schools.
(5) In some places, agriculture is their primary source of 
subsistence. Most of the Betawi dominated area is a source of 
fruit for Jakarta. Generally, the Betawi are small farmers who 
have less than 1/4 ha land (Koentjaraningrat, 1976:102; Santoso, 
1964:98).
(6) The study conducted by Dhofier in 1974 revealed that 61 percent of 
his respondents had never had any secular education and only 10 
percent had gone beyond primary school; whilst Koentjaraningrat 
found in 1973 that 57 percent of his respondents had no education 
(Dhofier, 1976:70; Koentjaraningrat, 1975:22).
Page 33
Religious leaders play an important role among the Betawi. In a 
survey conducted by Postma, for example, which investigated people who 
were asked for advice in times of difficulties, 40 percent of the 
Betawi answered 'religious leaders' compared with 3 percent for non 
Betawi (Postma, 1972:71)* In the conclusion of his research, Yusuf 
(1974) suggested that the secularism which prevails in Jakarta has had 
very little effect on the Betawi. They also reject western 
influences, such as dancing, drinking etc. There is often conflict 
between the Betawi and newcomers about this. This rejection is 
reflected in the speeches of religious leaders such as the following :
"Our young generation are now threatened by alien cultures. 
Infidel cultures, western music, western dances, nightclub, 
drinking and other sinful ways of life are now introduced to 
our communities. Stand up brother and intensify religious 
courses (8).
In the experience of the author, this speech can be heard almost every 
day in all religious courses, religious radio programs and religious 
ceremonies conducted by all religious leaders. The same person will 
say the same thing in different places, even the most knowledgeable of 
the religious leaders. This is clearly an area of great concern to 
them.
(7) In the Betawi dominated area, half of the educational institutions
are religious institutions (Probonegoro, 1974:119—124).
Sensitivity toward Christianization was experienced by the author 
when conducting research among the Betawi. They always refuse the 
Chinese and Christian interviewers because they are afraid of 
Christian propaganda.
(8) This speech was recorded by Dhofier in his research in Tegal 
Parang in 1975*
Page 34
Koentjaraningrat (1975) used religion, wealth and education as 
dimensions of social stratification among the Betawi. Dhofier (1974) 
used the wealth and religion dimensions only, because the Betawi are 
poorly educated. This stratification was also used by Santoso (1964) 
and Probonegoro (1974). It seems that there is no formal 
stratification among the Betawi; the strata described by these 
authors are only informal . These strata exist , however, as proved 
by hypergamy in marriage; for example, for the non haj, it is ideal 
to marry into the haj group, — people who have performed the fifth 
principle of Islam, which is to make a pilgrimage to Mecca —  but not 
vice versa (Probonegoro, 1974:173)*
Based on religion and wealth, the Betawi society can be divided 
into Haj/non haj and wealthy/poor. There is a positive relationship 
between haj and wealth since all wealthy people strive to go on the 
haj. There are some poor people who are haji, but the number is very 
small because it is very expensive to go on the haj. All Betawi who 
have performed the haj are included in the elite group of the society. 
They show their distinctiveness as haj in almost all Betawi formal and 
informal meetings by wearing haj costume (actually Arab costume); no 
one has the right to wear the haj costume before performing the haj. 
Also in daily life thay have to be called by the title, haji, before 
their name, for example, Haji Ali, Haji Hasan etc. Since being a haji 
means entry to the elite group, this may explain why the Betawi do not 
mind sacrificing their wealth to go to Mecca. They also have a big 
party a few days before they go to Mecca and after they come back from 
Mecca. From the sociological point of view, the parties can be 
regarded as an announcement that the person has the right of entry to
a new position.
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There are three strata of religious leaders: Ulama, Kiyai haji
and Ustadz. So far, no Betawi has become an ulama and only two Betawi 
are Kiyai Haji, Kiyai Haji Syafii and Kiyai Haji Thahir. They are 
very popular among the Betawi —  even among other Muslims in Jakarta 
-- and they have great power and charisma among their followers who 
are mostly Betawi. In relation to the topic of this thesis, it is 
interesting to note that there are two Betawi women who are actively 
involved in religious activities, a daughter and daughter in law of 
Kiyai Haji Syafii. They are honoured by Betawi society. These women 
are both highly educated which suggests that education might lead to a 
better position for Betawi women. In fact, it is noteworthy that 
religious teachings encourage women to be active in religious affairs; 
this is considered to be an ideal thing for both men and women. The 
reception of those two women might have been different if religious 
teachings opposed the participation of women.
To be an ulama, one must be an expert in the Islamic religion and 
must give religious courses. One also must be able to solve religious 
problems. Ulama have a very wide religious knowledge. Usually they 
receive their religious education in the Middle East or in famous 
pesantren in Indonesia. A kiyai haji must be an expert in Islamic 
religion but unlike the ulama they are not sufficiently qualified to 
make difficult interpretations of the meaning of the Qur'an and 
hadith. Generally they are students of ulama (9)* Like ulama they 
also give religious courses at the national level whereas ustadz give 
religious courses at the local level only.
(9) Kiyai Haji Syafii and Kiyai Haji Thahir were students of ulama in 
Jakarta who were of Arabic descent; most ulama are Arab descent 
and this explains why they have a good position among the Betawi.
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To become an expert in Islamic religion one must have received 
religious education in a pesantren which usually takes many years and 
costs a great deal. This also explains why Betawi Kiyai Haji are also 
members of the wealthy group (10).
II.3 Respondent Background
The following description mostly deals with the married 
respondents since no related information was available for those who 
were single, except for age. Most of the single male respondents (83 
percent) were aged between 15 and 24 with the median age being 21, 
while 87 percent of the single female respondents were aged 15-19 with 
the median age being 17- For the ever-married female respondents, 46 
percent were aged less than 30, 34 percent were aged 30-44 and the 
rest (20 percent) were aged over 45* The corresponding proportions 
were 24 percent, 44 percent and 32 percent for ever married male 
respondents.
Only 76 percent of ever married female respondents and 79 percent 
of ever married male respondents were in their first marriage. 
Fourteen percent of male respondents and 16 percent of female 
respondents were divorced from their first marriage, and the rest were 
widowed.
(10) Some articles about pesantren are, for example, Castle, (1966); 
Soed,joko,P (1972) and Yusuf (1 974).
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Twenty seven percent of respondents had never received any formal 
education. Of those who went to school, 55 percent went to government 
schools, 29 percent went to religious schools and the rest went to 
both types of school. The percentages of respondents who had no 
education and who went to religious schools were higher for female 
than for male respondents.
Only 2 percent of male and female respondents were born in 
another city or province. Eighty five percent of male respondents 
were born in the village where the research was conducted, 6 percent 
were born in the neighbouring villages and the rest in other villages 
in Jakarta; the numbers were 76 percent, 11 percent and 8 percent 
respectively for female respondents. Also the village endogamy rate 
(that is the proportion of Betawi marrying someone from the same 
village) was quite high (52 percent).
Even though most respondents stated that they owned a farm, most 
of them (48 percent) had less than 50 square metres, but 23 percent 
had more than 1000 square metres. An attempt was also made to divide 
respondents in terms of household possessions owned. This resulted in 
73 percent of respondents being categorized as higher economic class. 
They owned a cupboard, stove, petromax and one or some of the 
following items : radio, watch, bicycle, iron, sewing machine, and 
television. Those defined as lower economic class owned only a 
cupboard, stove and petromax.
Unfortunately there is no data concerning the occupations of 
female respondents , but there is information about the occupation of 
male respondents' wives, which showed that 93 percent of them did not 
work outside the family circle. Among male respondents only 4 percent
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did not work. The highest proportion for male occupations was trader 
(36 percent) without any further information, but based on observation 
(author's experience), most of them would probably be fruit sellers, 
which usually includes actually growing the fruits as well. Assuming 
that this was true, this means that 48 percent of respondents were 
farmers (since 12 percent stated themselves as fruit farmers). The 
second highest proportion was office or factory worker (24 percent), 
again without any further information, but based on their education, 
it seems that most of them were not white collar workers (62 percent 
were primary school educated or less).
Table IT.5
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The only available data to measure religious intensity were 
derived from a question on the respondent's favourite radio program* 
Based on the assumption that religious people were more likely to 
listen to religious programs, 25 percent of the respondents could be 
categorized as higher religiosity and the rest as lower religiosity.
Based on their education, mobility and occupation distributions, 
it is apparent that the respondents' characteristics resemble the 
Betawi description as outlined above.
CHAPTER III
E D U C A T I O N
All over the world the movement to improve the position of women 
has always emphasized education as one of the most significant 
instruments for changing women's subjugated position in society since 
education equips women with the knowledge and expertise necessary to 
play many modern roles and thereby enables them to hold favourable 
positions in society vis-a-vis men. It is a critical factor in the 
improvement of the position of women. Newcombe, for example, found 
that western education played an important role in the process of 
change in the position of Chinese upper class women in China (Newcomb, 
1967). Also Sweet (1968) concluded that education affected the range 
of opportunities available to women in Mediterranean countries. This 
is supported by Keddie and Beck who said :
"There is no doubt that there have been very significant 
advances made by the educated women in most Middle Eastern 
countries. This is clearly true in Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Iran and to a varying degree in Arab Asia and the Maghreb. 
It seems reasonable to hope that the continued spread of
education ..........  will lead to further positive changes
in women's role (Keddie and Beck, 1978:16).
Smock has written as follows (1972:402):
"The data from various countries attest the efficacy of 
education as a major force in redefining women’s roles. 
Education for women has both microscopic and macroscopic 
implications; that is, education may transform the 
attitudes and the self image of individual women, while at 
the societal level it often alters the balance in male - 
female roles and widens the sphere of permissible feminine 
activities."
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If we follow the history of the women's movement in Indonesia, it 
seems that education is one of the two factors which have always been 
sought. The other is reform of the marriage law. Education is 
regarded as the most effective method of emancipating women (Soeroto, 
1977; Soewondo, 1955; Stuers, I960). It is explicitly stated in the 
country monograph prepared by Indonesia for the World Population Year 
that :
"An improvement in education will also promote the female 
emancipation in the household as well as society and achieve 
a better social position for women in Indonesia (CICRED, 
1974:22).
In fact education improves not only the position of women, but also 
that of their families. Many people who speak about women's rights 
argue that women must be edu .ated primarily in order to educate their 
families. R.A. Kartini, for example, the first Indonesian women to 
fight for the emancipation of women in Indonesia in the 19th century, 
argued that education was the most important factor, in the 
improvement of both the position of women and their families. All her 
struggle related to the improvement of the education of Indonesian 
women. She wrote:
"How can it be denied that it is the women who have to 
fulfill the most important task in the moral training of
society?.... They have been given the task by nature itself.
As mothers they are the first educator of humanity. In 
their laps the children first learn to feel, think and 
speak; and in most cases this early education continues to
have an impact for the remainder of life.........  But how
then is it possible for Javanese mothers to educate their 
children if they themselves are uneducated."
(Penders,Ch.L.M., 1978:50-31).
Thus it is understandable that education has a specific place in the
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l i t e r a t u r e  on the  p o s i t i o n  o f  women.
Three  main t o p i c s  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  in  t h i s  c h a p t e r :  fo rm al  
e d u c a t i o n ,  i n f o r m a l  e d u c a t i o n  and p r o s p e c t s  f o r  e d u c a t i o n .  The
a s p e c t s  which w i l l  be cove red  in  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  fo rm a l  e d u c a t i o n
a r e  the  l e v e l  o f  fo rm al  e d u c a t i o n  o f  Be tawi  women compared to  Betawi 
men and o t h e r  women i n  J a k a r t a ;  t h e  t r e n d  o f  fo rm a l  e d u c a t i o n  o f  the
Betawi women compared to  the  t r e n d  f o r  Betawi  men and o t h e r  women in
J a k a r t a ;  t h e  t r e n d  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  Betawi women and Betawi men 
compared to the  t r e n d  of  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tw een  men and women in  J a k a r t a .  
Two a s p e c t s  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  i n f o r m a l  e d u c a t i o n .  
These a r e  the  r o l e  o f  t h e  mass media and knowledge o f  t h e  m a r r i a g e  law 
used as  an i n d i c a t o r  o f  g e n e r a l  knowledge .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  a s p e c t s  
i n v e s t i g a t e d  in  the  m a t t e r  o f  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  e d u c a t i o n  i n c l u d e  
a t t i t u d e s  toward e d u c a t i o n ,  r e a s o n s  f o r  d r o p - o u t  from s c h o o l ,  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  p ro v id e d  f o r  e d u c a t i o n  and o t h e r  a s p e c t s  which 
i n d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  e d u c a t i o n ,  f o r  example,  e a r l y  m a r r i a g e .
I I I . 1  Formal  E d u c a t i o n
The d a t a  used in  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  were o b t a i n e d  from the  
1978 M a r r i a g e  Survey and the  1971 Census .  The M a r r i a g e  Su rvey  
d e s c r i b e d  th e  e d u c a t i o n  o f  t h e  Betawi  w h i l s t  t h e  ce n su s  d e s c r i b e d  the  
e d u c a t i o n  o f  pe op le  in  J a k a r t a .  J a k a r t a  i s  used f o r  compar ison  
b e c a u s e  b o th  the  Betawi and o t h e r  p e o p le  i n  J a k a r t a  have r e l a t i v e l y  
s i m i l a r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  t erm o f  a c c e s s  to  f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h e y  l i v e  in  
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Even though most authors have said that the Betawi are poorly
educated (Castles, 1967; Dhofier, 1976; Guinness, 1972
Koentjaraningrat, 1975; Probonegoro, 1974; Santoso, 1965; Yusuf,
1974), their condition is not bad compared to other people in Jakarta. 
The proportion never attending school is higher among people in 
Jakarta, whilst the proportion who attended primary school is higher 
among the Betawi. However at the secondary level and beyond, Betawi 
education is lower. This means that the Betawi are poorly educated in 
terms of higher levels of education. These data should be interpreted 
cautiously; for example, the comparison between the census and the 
survey may not be strictly valid as the survey was probably much more 
likely to have obtained information on madrasah education which would 
have been classified as primary. On the other hand, a lot of migrants 
to Jakarta were persons with high education. There is no doubt, 
however, that the Betawi have had a high level of drop out from 
primary school.
Although the education level among the younger Betawi is poor 
compared to the Jakarta population, the rate of decline in no 
schooling and the rate of increase in higher education is faster than 
for people in Jakarta. This might be affected by the fact that the 
education level among the older Betawi is very poor.
In comparing the education of Betawi women and women in Jakarta, 
it is better to use higher education, as there is some doubt whether 
the comparison between census and survey for the primary level is 
accurate. On this basis, the education of Betawi women is much lower 
compared to the other women in Jakarta, but the rate of increase among 
the Betawi is faster. For example, eight percent of Betawi women aged
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less than thirty had gone to high school compared to two percent among 
women aged 50-44 whilst among women in Jakarta the improvement is only 
one-third (19 percent among people aged less than thirty compared to 
15 percent among people aged 30-44)* No Betawi woman of any age had 
tertiary education. The same conclusions apply for Betawi men 
compared to men in Jakarta.
Among the Betawi, the level of education for females is much 
lower than that for males, both in religious and government schools. 
For example, 40 percent of females had never been to school compared 
to 21 percent of males, and only 3 percent of females have high school 
education compared to 18 percent for males. The sex differences were 
not so great among people in Jakarta at least among those who had some 
education. However, education levels are increasing faster for Betawi 
women than for men. The same thing has happened among people in 
Jakarta where the improvement for females is faster than for males, 
but the differences of level of education between males and females is 
bigger among the Betawi. Related to this problem, Hull (1 97C>: 80-84) 
found that poverty is one reason for the big difference in education 
between males and females in Jogjakarta. This reason might be applied 
among the Betawi since most Betawi come from the lower economic class. 
The different function of girls in lower and upper class households 
might have contributed to this problem. In the lower class, girls 
start helping their mother when they are very young; this is not the 
case in the upper class because the mother has servants to help her.
The proportion of Betawi who have attended a religious school 
(Table III.2) is quite high (29 percent) especially for females for 
whom 50 percent of those who had been to school attended a religious
Table III.2
Type and Level of School of the Betawia
Ever Married Males Ever Married Females
Type of Education <30 30-44 45+ Total <30 30-44 45+ Total Both
Sexes
Government 74 74 62 71 41 33 10 37 55
Religious 5 7 27 11 44 59 80 50 29
Combination 21 19 11 18 14 7 10 12 5
No reply - - - - 1 1 - 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(100)
Level of Religious School
(167) ( 82) (349) (201) ( 87) ( 21) (310) (659)
Primary lSt - 2n - 11 18 11 14 16 22 16 14
3rd - 5th 41 29 46 36 53 52 67 54 49
Finished 12 6 13 9 22 23 11 21 18
Unspecified 12 23 13 18 3 5 - 3 7
Junior High School 29 11 5 14 5 4 - 4 7
Senior High School - 11 5 7 4 - - 2 4
Tertiary 6 9 - 5 - - - - 2




( 35) ( 22) ( 74) (110) ( 56) ( 18) (184) (258)
Primary 1st- 2n<^ 6 7 23 10 8 19 25 11 10
3rd- 5th 15 32 55 31 43 50 75 46 36
Finished 40 38 17 35 38 28 - 35 35
Unspecified 5 6 2 4 4 3 - 4 5
Junior High School 16 12 - 11 5 - - 4 9
Senior High School 16 3 3 7 2 - - 1 5
Tertiary 2 2 - 2 - - - - 1
Total 100 100 100 101 100 100 100 101 101
( 95) (155) ( 60) (310) (116) ( 36) ( 4) (156) (466)
a The total is not the same as the total ini Table! III.l , because this table
deals only with respondents who had ever been to school. Also the total 
of respondents who stated their level in religious school and government 
school is higher than the total in the Type of Education column, because 
there is double statement by respondents who had both types of education
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school, compared to 11 percent for males. Moreover, if we look at the 
oldest age group, 80 percent of women who received some schooling went 
to religious schools compared to 27 percent for males of the same age. 
There is a downward trend for attendance at religious schools for both 
males and females, but it seems that religious education is still 
considered important for females where for the youngest age group, 44 
percent of female respondents went to religious schools compared to 5 
percent for males respondents; and for the single respondents 45 
percent of females went to religious schools compared to 4 percent for 
males•
Most Betawi women dropped out of primary school, a very small 
proportion went to secondary school and none continued to the tertiary 
level. This is not the case for males. This gives an impression that 
girls were sent to school only to prepare them to be good wives and 
mothers. This is apparent also in the saying: "No matter how high a 
girl's education, her place is in the kitchen", which can be heard in 
many parts of Indonesia including among the Betawi. As in other 
Muslim societies, women are not expected to go out to work and earn 
but to remain at home looking after their husbands and children. 
There is no doubt that education is indispensable for taking up modern 
occupational roles and since the occupational role is not considered 
important, education is devalued. Thus lack of socially defined 
occupational roles detracts from the importance of education as a tool 
for achieving occupational skills. Also as in other developing 
countries, girls start to help their parents with the housework when 
they are very young. Finally, the practice of early marriage which is 
widely prevalent among the Betawi is another major factor preventing 
the girl from continuing her education. There is a tendency for some
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people to reluctantly send their daughters to school, since they think 
that education will be harmful to their daughter's reputation (1). 
There is no serious problem in sending their daughters to religious 
schools, because contact between the sexes is strictly limited. The 
other reason leading to the high proportion of girls in religious 
schools is a religious reason. According to religious teachings it is 
a responsibility of the parents to give religious education to their 
children. The parents will be blamed by God if the children know 
nothing about religion.
III.2 Informal Education
Two main topics will be covered in discussing informal education, 
these are usage of mass media which is regarded as a channel of 
informal education and knowledge of the marriage law which is regarded 
as an indicator of ordinary knowledge, since this knowledge is closely 
related to the position of women.
(1) The same attitude is found even among higher educated people in 
the Muslim enviroment. A study conducted among Cairo University 
students showed that a great majority of both boys and girls 
expressed the opinion that a girl who mixed freely with men in the 
university would harm her reputation (Nelson, 1968:73)
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III.2. 1 Mass Media
The newspaper is one of the most important ordinary knowledge 
sources besides radio, magazines and television. Not many Betawi use 
newspapers to improve their knowledge, as only 26 percent read a 
newspaper once a week or more (8 percent read it everyday - Table 
III.3)* Reading of newspapers in Jakarta is generally infrequent, in 
fact, only 34 percent of people in Jakarta read newspapers (2). Since 
there is no information about the frequency of newspaper reading among 
the Jakarta population, no further comparison can be made between the 
Betawi and people in Jakarta.
Both for married and single respondents, males read more 
frequently than females. By comparing the single and married 
respondents, it is clear that the younger generation uses newspapers 
much more than the older. The same conclusion is drawn if the
comparison is made between age groups of the ever married respondents. 
The proportion of females who read newspapers increases with declining 
age group and even though the male respondents utilize newspapers more 
than females, the difference is less at the younger ages. The 
extremely small proportion reading newspapers in the oldest age group 
especially for females - is due to the fact that a large proportion 
are illiterate, whilst the bigger difference between married males and 
married females compared to single males and single females is due to 
both illiteracy and lack of time. It is unquestioned that married
(2) This estimate was obtained from the Social Economic Survey 
conducted by the Office of Census and Statistics in Jakarta in 
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females are busier than the single, particularly the single females 
who are unemployed. Thus early marriage can be seen as not only a 
barrier for formal education but also for the informal as well.
Since newspapers are regarded as a channel of ordinary knowledge, 
information about the kind of article which is read is important. 
Unfortunately such data are not available. Similar conclusions can be 
drawn for magazines and television, except that the frequency of 
reading magazines is lower than reading the newspapers whilst the 
frequency of watching television is higher than the frequency of 
reading newspapers. The lower frequency of reading magazines is 
caused by their greater expense and also by the fact that they are 
published only weekly or monthly. The frequency of watching 
television is higher because television can be watched by many people 
at the same time.
For the third form of mass medium, that is radio, data on both 
frequency and kind of program are available. It seems that radio 
listening is much more popular than newspaper reading, as 75 percent 
of respondents listen to the radio often. This is quite high compared 
to the results of the Social Economic Survey, which showed that 37 
percent of people in Jakarta never listen to the radio (Kantor Sensus 
dan Statistik D.K.T., 1977:80). The same reason discussed before can 
be applied here; radio can be utilized by many people at the same 
time and also the price is much cheaper than television.
As with newspapers, both for married and single respondents, men 
listen to the radio more frequently than women and also the younger 
listen more frequently than the older —  based on comparison of the 
single and married groups. Also by comparing the three age groups, it
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can be seen that listening frequency increases with younger age. 
Again, like newspaper reading, the difference between the proportion 
of men and women who listen to the radio is getting less through time. 
Differently from newspapers, the proportion of ever married women who 
listen to the radio is similar to the proportion among single women. 
This is because the "time factor" does not play a role, as a woman can 
listen to the radio whilst she is doing something else. Of course, 
radio listening also does not require literacy.
Although quite a large number of respondents listen to the radio, 
most of them prefer to listen to songs (44 percent) and religious 
programs (25 percent), whilst a very small proportion prefer the news 
(2 percent). Among the younger generation, almost one hundred percent 
prefer songs. Apparently, radio does not necessarily operate as a 
channel of informal education among the Betawi, particularly among the 
younger people.
Those who listen to religious programs primarily listen to the 
Assyafiiah and Attahiriyah broadcasts which are made by Kiyai Haji 
Syafii and Kiyai Haji Thahir (see Chapter.II). Further content 
analysis of these broadcasts would be useful. It is interesting that 
the proportion who listen to religious programs increases with age for 
both males and females. The possible implications are that the value 
given to the function of religion is decreasing or that older people 
are more likely to prefer religious programs. The decreasing function 
of religion is more pronounced among males . In fact when asked about 
their second favourite program, the most common response for males was 
news whilst for females it was religious programs.
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If the frequency of usage of radio, newspapers and television 
is compared, the frequency of use of newspapers is the lowest, even 
though this mass media may be considered most effective for the 
distribution of information, due to the fact that the content is not 
limited by time and space, and because its cost is lower.
III.2.2 General Knowledge
As mentioned before, the knowledge of the Betawi about the new 
Marriage Law in Indonesia will be used as an indicator of their 
general knowledge. Besides the fact that the new law is related to 
the position of women, the law was enacted with well publicised 
controversy. Many people, especially the Muslim religious groups, 
opposed the law. The many protests could be followed through the mass 
media, particularly the media belonging to the Muslim groups, such as 
radio Assyafiiah and Attahariyah, and the newspaper, Pelita. In 
brief, there were two reasons for the Muslim objections. First, the 
marriage law for Muslims is stated very clearly in the Qur'an and 
Hadith. Second, it was claimed that to some extent, the new law was 
in conflict with the law in the Qur'an. It took quite a long time 
with much discussion of amendments to the law before the Muslim groups 
accepted the new law. Because of this situation, it can be expected 
that Muslims in general should know about the law.
Contrary to this expectation, less than one-fifth of respondents 
knew about the law (Table III.4). It is difficult to explain why 18 
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of marriage for women, whilst only 10 percent knew that there was a 
similar law for men. Among those who knew about the law, only 10 
percent stated the correct legal age at marriage for girls and 7 
percent stated the correct legal age at marriage for boys (3)*
The law is apparently better known by men than women as 28 
percent of male respondents knew about the age of marriage law for 
women compared to 9 percent of female respondents , and 17 percent of 
male respondents knew that the same law applied to males compared to 5 
percent for female respondents. Twelve percent of male respondents 
who knew about the law stated the correct legal age for boys while no 
female respondent was able to do so. From a total of 612 female 
respondents, only 8 were able to correctly state the minimum legal age 
at marriage for girls compared with 11 from 531 male respondents.
Even though the older generation prefer religious radio 
programmes to a greater extent than the younger , in fact the younger 
people knew more about the law. This may be because the proportion 
reading newspapers was much lower among older persons, as they prefer 
to listen to religious doctrine rather than to follow current affairs. 
Generally speaking, the ordinary knowledge of the Betawi is poor but 
the knowledge of the women, especially the older women is very poor 
indeed. This situation is understandable given that usage of mass 
media as sources of this knowledge is very rare.
(3)* The legal age at first marriage was 16 for a girl and 19 for a 
boy
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III.3 Prospects of Education
The historical background of education of the Betawi (Castles, 
1967:202-204) gives the impression that the lack of opportunity to go 
to school was the only factor which hampered the improvement of 
education among the Betawi. In fact, their educational participation 
is still very low now. Therefore, in discussing the prospects for 
education for the Betawi, not only the opportunities provided should 
be discussed, but also the social factors which affect education 
directly or indirectly. Thus, three main topics will be discussed in 
this section: reasons for drop-out from school, attitude toward 
education and facilities provided for education.
111.3*1 Reasons for drop out from school
The most important reason for drop out from school (Table III.5) 
both for males and females was the economic factor (55 percent). This 
included the following responses : lack of money (64 percent for 
males and 29 percent for females), to work (4 percent for males and 
none for females) and parents died (2 percent for males and 1 percent 
for females). In other words, the poor economic circumstances of 
parents have hampered the education of their children (4). 
Surprisingly, the proportion stating economic reasons for drop out has 
increased through time. This is probably caused by the increasing 
cost of living in Indonesia and the high cost of education in Jakarta. 
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further, the Betawi sacrifice their children's education. Education 
in Indonesia is not free even in the government schools. Apart from 
that, government policy does not give high priority to education of 
the poor. The problem of school fees remains unsolved for the poor .
A study conducted by Koentjaraningart among the Betawi in 1972 showed 
that the Betawi spent only 2 percent of their income on education 
compared to 71 percent for consumption (Koentjaraningrat, 1975:90). 
On the contrary, research conducted by Papanek among middle class 
families in Jakarta in 197^ showed that they spent 30 percent of their 
income on the schooling of their children (Papanek, 1975:85). This 
implies that education is the single most expensive item in the 
household•
The second most important direct reason for drop out is marriage, 
but this applies to females only. Thirty percent of girls left school 
in order to marry compared to 3 percent for boys. Contrary to 
expectation, this reason has not decreased through time. The next 
most important set of reasons for drop out are educational reasons (9 
percent and 18 percent for males and females respectively). These 
include responses such as "too lazy to study", "stupid", "friend's 
influence", "did not like the teacher" and "not many people went to 
school at the time". This last reason seems a weak reason for drop 
out. In these cases drop out could have been avoided if the parents 
had had an awareness of the importance of education, but, as has been
(4) According to Beeby (1979:1^0), all investigators whatever method 
they adopted and at all levels of schooling, were unanimous in 
their conclusion that dropping out from school in Indonesia is an 
economic problem rather than an educational one. Also Guinness in 
his research among the Betawi found that the parents complained 
about the burden of school fees, saying they were unable to pay 
them, and they were further burdened with the cost of books, 
school contributions, etc (Guinness, 1972:130).
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discussed above, it seems that the Betawi often do not give serious 
attention to education. Beeby in his research in Indonesia (1979:167) 
found that the second most common cause of drop out, though much less 
frequent than poverty, was the parents' limited awareness concerning 
education.
111.5*2 Attitudes toward education
As has been stated by Beeby, parents' awareness concerning 
education is one of the factors influencing the children's education. 
So two main points will be discussed, the attitude toward education 
and the attitude toward early marriage since it is assumed that 
marriage can affect education indirectly, through the value given to 
marriage compared to education. This topic will be discussed from the 
different socio-economic points of view. Beeby and Papanek have 
stated that these factors influence the education of children.
"A comparison between socio-economic status of graduates and 
of drop-outs confirmed the finding from interview and 
questionaire. The lower the level of the father's education 
and of his occupation, the less was the chance of a student 
completing each stage of schooling (Beeby, 1979:16^-8).
This statement can be interpreted to mean that socio-economic status 
of parents can affect the education of children, directly or 
indirectly. The direct effect has been covered in the previous 
discussion which revealed that the economic factor is the most 
important one in drop-out. The indirect effect of socio economic
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status upon education is its effect upon attitudes toward education. 
Four variables have been used as measures of socio-economic status: 
education, economic status, occupation and religiosity.
Apparently education is not universally highly valued, as one 
quarter of respondents do not regret that they did not continue their 
education (5). This proportion is much bigger for females (32 
percent) than for males (18 percent). The higher proportion for 
females indicates their relative lack of aspirations for formal 
education. However a striking fact in terms of social change may well 
be that three quarters did have regrets. On the face of it, this 
proportion seems high. The 69 percent of married women who regretted 
not continuing their schooling is quite substantial given the cultural 
background from which they come. Even though social change has taken 
place, changes have occurred mostly among the men. The proportion who 
regret leaving school decreases as age increases but to a much greater 
extent for men than for women (Table III.6).
Guinness (1972:129-30) gained the impression that there is an 
apathy toward education among the Betawi, and that this apathy grew 
into open hostility among the traders. This group tended to mistrust 
education, considering that it is only a hindrance in market trading. 
The value that they placed on time affected their attitude toward 
education. The Betawi tend to be present-time oriented. As their 
jobs brought in an income varying from day to day, they have never
(5) The proportion may well be bigger since some respondents might 
have given what they thought to be the expected answer. They know 
that the interviewer is an educated person and they might feel 






























































felt encouraged to plan for the future. This attitude may now be 
changing due to the changing occupational structure. Based on the way 
they raise their children and on their folk-drama, it seems that the 
Betawi feel the greatest respect not for the learned or the educated, 
but for the champion and the 'orang berilmu' who in their bodies carry 
a power which can defeat the enemy. Furthermore, their experience has 
taught them that even for educated people it is still difficult to get 
a job; sometimes it is easier for the uneducated to find work because 
they can take any kind of job. For educated people there may be a 
conflict between their education and the nature of the work available 
to them. Also even if they gain a high school diploma, they are at a 
disadvantage in Jakarta's difficult employment situation, where 
obtaining a position is often possible only through personal contacts 
or monetary payments. Since there are very few Betawi who occupy high 
positions in society and they are also generally poor, they could not 
manage this situation. This is also one of the factors which has 
discouraged them from improving their education. There is also 
another factor which influences education, that is the attitude toward 
marriage. Since marriage as a reason for drop-out from school applied 
for female respondents only, the discussion here will deal with 
attitudes toward early marriage for girls.
It seems that early marriage is considered to be very important, 
as almost half of the respondents (46 percent) agree with early 
marriage for girls, even though the question is worded so that the 
opposite response might be expected (Table III.7). Males are less 
likely to agree with early marriage, but the proportion agreeing is 
still high (32 percent). The same applies to single respondents. 
Even though there is a difference between the opinion of married and
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single females, there is no difference between the three age groups of 
married females. This is very interesting, as it might be expected 
that the younger age group would be more liberal as was the case with 
male respondents. Apparently women worry about the future of their 
daughters. As an effect the proportion stating marriage as a reason 
for drop-out from school is approximately the same through time (Table 
III.5)» It is not clear however whether the attitude toward early 
marriage precedes the low participation rate in education or vice 
versa. But since the proportion of women who value early marriage is 
high, particularly for married women, it might be very difficult for 
the Betawi women to continue to high school.
Since there is a quite high proportion who approve of early 
marriage, it is understandable that there is also a quite high 
proportion who value early marriage more than education (Table III.8). 
Again it is clear that single respondents and men are more liberal in 
their attitude. However, in this case there is a slight difference 
between the three age groups of married females. This may indicate 
that there is a social change in the attitude of women toward 
education.
Virtually all groups shown in table III.8 value education more 
highly than early marriage for girls but the degree is different with 
the educated, those of high economic status, the wage employees and 
the more religious respondents placing a higher value on education. 
It is also shown in table III.7 that the proportion valuing early 
marriage is lower for those of high economic status, those with high 
education and the more religious respondents. There is undoubtedly a
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socio-economic status. It is therefore of interest to note that the 
strongest positive attitudes towards education for girls are found 
among the more educated respondents. Education therefore breeds 
further education. Again the tables show that male approval of 
education for girls is higher than female even among the educated, 
high economic status and higher religiosity respondents. These data 
imply that the education of children, particularly daughters, will be 
better if the decision maker in the household (especially in 
education) is the father rather than the mother.
It is interesting that the more religious people are more 
disposed towards education for girls than the non-religious. This may 
seem to be against expectation. One can argue that stated preference 
for religious radio programs (the indicator used to measure
religiosity) does not guarantee that the listener is a religious 
person. However, the same result has been found in other provinces of 
Indonesia although different indicators of religious intensity were 
used (unpublished data). This casts doubt upon White's statement 
(1978:52-68) that reforms which reduce the inequalities in the 
traditional Islamic law affecting women are the only path to social 
development. She claimed that without such reforms, high literacy 
rates are not likely to appear. She opposed the opinion that economic 
development could affect women's educational achievement. She cited 
Turkey and Tunisia as having reformed many laws affecting women 
compared to Libya and Saudi Arabia as countries which have introduced 
few or no reforms. Libya and Saudi Arabia are better placed in terms 
of economic wealth, but Turkey and Tunisia have higher rates of 
literacy for women compared to Saudi Arabia and Libya. On the other 
hand, Nath (1978) found that in Kuwait economic development has
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changed education levels of women very rapidly. Like Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait has introduced few legislative reforms. Another example is 
that of West Sumatra which is one of the most strict Muslim provinces 
in Indonesia, but on the other hand it has one of the highest levels 
of literacy in Tndonesia (Jones, 1976). It may be that White has 
neglected to take past history into account in making her comparisons. 
It takes time for educational development to be achieved. Saudi 
Arabia has only recently begun to develop its economy; it still needs 
time to provide for educational development as a response to economic 
development. If time is taken into account, there is a possibility 
that economic development is more important to improvement of 
education than the reform of Islamic law.
111.3*3 Education Facilities
As in other developing countries, the main constraint faced by 
the Indonesian government in implementing educational development is 
the challenging problem of the increase of the number of children to 
be accommodated in schools. The number of children to be educated 
usually cannot be catered for in the system established for this 
purpose. Daroesman found, for example, that the proportion of 
school-aged children enrolled in secular primary schools was only 64 
percent in 1970 (Daroesman, 1971:62); whilst Beeby found that 38 
percent of all primary schools in the more urbanized provinces had 
been unable to accept all applicants, mostly for lack of space. 
Together with the problem of school buildings, the teacher shortage 
posed the most serious problem because of the time required for
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training teachers. Beeby found, for example, that 40 percent of the 
secondary schools in the more populous provinces had been forced to 
reject applicants for entry, mostly for lack of space but partly 
because of the shortage of teachers. In fact, all these findings can 
be stated as one factor : that education facilities particularly at 
the secondary level are not expanding as quickly as the school-age 
population. Finally, the third problem which affects the prospects of 
education is school fees. Ruth Daroesman (1971) has said that school 
fees impose a growing and almost intolerable burden on the poorest 
group of parents, that some could probably not afford to send their 
children to school at all, and that many more could not keep them 
there.
If we agree with the conventional view that education is one of 
the critical factors in improving the position of women, it seems that 
the Betawi woman is in a disadvantageous position. It is evident that 
the education of Betawi women is poorer than that of Betawi men and 
other women in Jakarta. Apart from this, there is a quite high 
proportion of Betawi women who went to religious schools compared to 
Betawi men. Since religious schools are unlikely to equip women with 
skills necessary for many roles and positions in modern life, not much 
improvement can be expected in the position of Betawi women. This 
situation is aggravated by low utilization of mass media. A low level 
of general knowledge among Betawi women is unquestionable.
The increase in the education level of the Betawi women is faster 
than for other women in Jakarta and for the Betawi men, but it is 
limited to primary school only. Unless there is a social change in 
attitudes towards education, it is unlikely that many Betawi women
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will experience higher education. The high value given to early 
marriage for girls, the function of a girl in a household, the 
motivation of sending a girl to school, the serious economic 
difficulties in sending children to school and scarce facilities 
provided for education by the government, effectively bar Betawi girls 
from gaining higher education. In discussing the position of women, 
it is important to note not only the increase of participation in 
education per se, but also the effect of this in the larger context of 
social change. Unfortunately relevant data were not available in this 
survey and the author's personal knowledge is not sufficient since too 
few Betawi have been to high school. A hypothetical statement can, 
however be made. As long as the role changes harmonize with religious 
teachings, the Betawi can accept them, but this might not be the case 
if they are against religious teachings. This statement is supported 
by the experience of Kiyai Haji's daughter and daughter in law who 
work as religious teachers but are very popular in the community. 
Islam discourages women from working outside the family circle. Of 
course this is a very generalized statement which needs further
investigation.
CHAPTER IV
E M P L O Y M E N T
Beck and Keddie argue in their introduction (Beck and Keddie, 
1978:3) that there is a misinterpretation of the definition of an 
economically active person. This misinterpretation is influenced by 
the attitude, common in western industrial societies, of regarding 
only paid work as work. They said:
"A man whose occupation is raising grain for his own family 
and who must either give part of the crop to a landlord or 
sell it below value is generally listed in the census as a 
full time worker, while his wife who raises and tends the 
domestic animals, helps in weeding, harvesting and gleaning, 
grinds the grain, processes products for market, cleans 
house, gives birth and raises the children, and perhaps 
produces handicrafts that are sold by her husband is often 
listed as economically inactive even though these tasks are 
as crucial to the perpetuation of family and society as are 
his. Even if we bow to the current fashion that housework, 
childbearing and childrearing are not work, all careful 
observers note the heavy labour in connection with 
agriculture and domestic animals carried out by women."
Perhaps this limited definition has been applied in the present 
research among the Betawi as 93 percent of the wives of male 
respondents were categorized as "does not work" (Table IV. 1) (1). 
Even though this may be the result of a "wrong definition", this 
definition better fits the purposes of this discussion since the 
discussion will be based on the 'theory of marital power and 
resources', which says that a person's average power score generally
(1 ) Unfortunately there was no information from female respondents on 
their present occupation and so only indirect information (from 
their husband) can be presented.
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increases with increase in his or her education, income and 
occupational status, factors which are conceptualized as resources. 
It is said that by comparing the husband's and wife's resources, we 
will know who tends to make most of the decisions. The greater the 
gap between a wife's evaluation of resources contributed by her 
husband and the husband's evaluation of his wife, the greater is the 
husband's power, and vice versa (Blood and Wolf, 1960)(2). From this 
theory, only jobs which raise money give rise to power as well, hence 
the rather limited definition is considered adequate for this 
discussion. It is noteworthy that the society itself has never
considered housework or unpaid agricultural work as a job. For wives, 
work of this type is merely part of their every day life and therefore 
has no bearing on their status or power.
IV.1 Women's Employment Participation Rate among the Betawi
It is evident that 93 percent of the married Betawi women did not 
work (Table IV.1). Applying the theory of marital power and resources 
work to the Betawi, this would mean that the Betawi married woman does 
not have a strong position as a decision maker in her household. 
Although there is another factor, education, which is also considered 
to influence marital power, it has been argued that a women's 
employment is more important than her education in determining her 
position (Oppong, 1970). In any case, among the Betawi, husbands and
(2) Several studies have examined marital power in relation to the 
wife's working status. The findings of most of these studies 
indicate that working wives have more marital power than the 
non-working wives (see Chapter i).
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wives have similar education levels (Muliakusuma, 1979:62).
Since there was no information about the nature of Betawi women’s 
participation at some past time to use as bench marks against which to 
compare their current situation, the three broad age groups will be 
used, instead. By comparing the three age groups in Table IV.1, it is 
apparent that Betawi women have not experienced any marked change in 
their occupational status, but the men have. There was a shift for 
men from agricultural jobs into factory and office jobs which might be 
due to industrialization, which has been encouraged since 1950, and 
improvement in education levels (3)* It is generally
expected that industrialization will increase the rate of 
participation of women in the labor force, but it seems that this 
expectation has not been realized among the Betawi (4). Since the 
evidence in other countries shows that women's participation in the 
labor force is one of the factors contributing to change in their 
position, apparently there is no great opportunity for Betawi women 
to improve their position through this means. Marital status also 
does not have any bearing upon employment participation among the 
Betawi women. Based on the responses of husbands, 92 percent of wives 
did not work before marriage compared to 93 percent after marriage. 
It is interesting to note that there is a difference between the 
statement given by the husband and by the wife herself. According to 
the husbands, 93 percent of their wives had not worked before marriage 
compared to 78 percent as stated by the female respondents. This
(3) Most new factories have been established on the fringes of 
Jakarta, areas which are dominated by the Betawi.
(4) Oey (1979) found that the advances which Indonesian women have 
been able to achieve have not been reflected in the labour force.
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indicates that for men, even for the youngest age group of husbands, 
the ideal is a women who does not work before or after marriage. This 
is relevant to Guinness' statement that the Betawi did not deny that 
wives can contribute to the family’s cash income, but they insisted 
that this is not the task of women. A man whose wife works is 
considered either lazy or too ambitious (Guiness, 1972). But some 
authors argued that there is a tendency for women to usually support 
anything which is likely to bring their emancipation nearer (de Lauwe, 
1962; Dodd, 1973-74; Piotrowski, 1962; Safilios, 1970). In this case, 
the only major occupation before marriage claimed by women was the 
making of emping, a low level household industry prominent in the 
area. So, men whose ideal was non-working women were more likely not 
to regard this home industry as a job, but women were more likely to 
regard it as a job. Thus, if some authors said that women tend to 
support anything which is likely to bring their emancipation nearer, 
we can also say that men tend to maintain the traditional division of 
role.
A low level of participation by women in the labour force is 
typical of Muslim countries and we may ask why is this the case (5)» 
Research conducted in Pakistan and Morocco (Korson, 1969; 
Forget, 1962; Youssef, 1978) showed that working outside the family 
circle would lead to a bad reputation for women, especially unmarried 
women; it could harm their prospects of marriage. If married women
(5) In most Muslim countries, the reported rate of female 
participation in economic activity is very low in comparison with 
other countries at similar levels of economic development 
(Youssef, 1974). Also White found that statistical evidence 
suggests that low levels of female education and female employment 
are typical of Muslim societies (White, 1978).
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worked outside the family circle, it could be harmful to their family 
stability. Both for single and married women, work outside the family 
circle could lower the status of the family, that is the husband’s or 
father's status. Youssef concluded therefore that criteria related to 
family standing and male honour in the community are powerful 
instruments in reducing the participation rates of women in work 
outside the family circle (1971:458-9). In accordance with this view, 
Table IV.1 shows that virtually all Betawi women who worked before 
marriage, worked in home industry and it can be asserted that the 
notion of male honour contributed to this situation.
Related to Youssef's argument, Jones (1977) in discussing female 
labour force participation in Jakarta also argued that the more 
traditionally Islamic attitude among the Betawi is one of the reasons 
for the low participation rate of women in Jakarta. Rahardjo has 
argued against the notion that religion alone is an important factor 
(Rahardjo, 1978:83). Her findings showed that among educated women in 
Indonesia, there were great similarities between Muslims and 
Christians in level as well as in pattern of work. She argued that 
this was due to the fact that Indonesia differs from other Muslim 
countries in that Indonesia has no seclusion or purdah system. 
However, this argument is too general. Rahardjo's research 
demonstrated only that educated Muslim women in Indonesia differed 
from Muslims in general in the other countries. The absence of 
seclusion among the educated women in Indonesia does not mean that 
there is no seclusion among other women in Indonesia. Thus, 
Rahardjo's research implies that the low female labour force 
participation rate among women in other Muslim countries is 
characteristic of uneducated Muslims rather than Muslims in general.
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Indeed, it has been stated in Islam that the role of breadwinner is 
the duty of a man, but factors such as education and modernization 
have changed attitudes toward this view. In Rahardjo's study, for 
example, education might have produced different attitudes among the 
Muslims. Whereas this discussion has dealt with different attitudes 
between persons with different levels of education within the same 
religion, Dodd (1974-75) has discussed the reverse situation. He 
found religious affiliation does not appear to have an effect on 
attitudes toward working women. There was no difference between 
educated Muslims and educated Christians in their attitude toward 
working women in Lebanon. He emphasized that it is important to 
assess the effect of religiosity for it may well be that persons with 
devout religious beliefs are more likely to have conservative role 
expectations for women. This problem has been stated as an 
hypothesis: 'women's educational achievement and participation in 
economic activity in Muslim countries varies with the enforcement of 
Islamic restriction on women (White, 1978:55)»' Therefore, in 
discussing Muslim society, it seems that we need to differentiate two 
groups of Muslims, that is devout Muslims and non-devout Muslims. 
There must be factors which have contributed to this differentiation 
among Muslims and one of them is likely to be education. Hence, in 
discussing Muslim behaviour, intervening variables such as education 
have to be taken into account rather than simply attributing all 
observed behaviour to the influence of the religion itself.
The other two reasons given by Jones in explaining the low 
participation rate among women in Jakarta were metropolitan character 
and limited employment opportunities. He said that female 
participation rates are typically lower in towns than in rural areas;
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he argued therefore that the low rate in Jakarta reflected its 
metropolitan character. Since Jones does not clarify the specific 
aspects of the metropolitan character which lead to low participation, 
it is not clear whether the Betawi can also be considered to be 
victims of the metropolitan city or not.
The most interesting explanation given by Jones was the limited 
employment opportunities in Jakarta. This situation is refelected in 
Table IV.2. The most common occupation for females was household 
servant (29 percent), followed by trading (22 percent). To be a 
household servant does not require much skill, education or capital. 
Thus the Betawi who are mostly poorly educated and come from low 
economic levels may have been expected to have worked as servants, 
particularly in the last two decades when a lot of wealthy newcomers 
have been moving into the Betawi dominated areas. In fact, the 
Jakarta born have the lowest proportion of servants except for those 
born outside Java who were more highly educated and much more strongly 
represented in professional and clerical occupations than the other 
groups (6). The existing argument is that non-working 
women as a group tend to be relatively better educated and would only 
look for white collar jobs rather than accepting lower paying jobs 
with low status (Hull, 1975; Rahardjo, 1978) (7). In fact the Betawi
(6) The proportion for Betawi might be much lower since some of the 
Jakarta born are not Betawi but other ethnic-groups such as 
Javanese and Sundanese who do not object to being a household 
servant.
(7) The same phenomenon is found in other countries such as Colombia, 
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women are poorly educated but they have low participation rates. 
Besides the argument that their low participation stemmed from their 
conservative Muslim attitudes, it seems that they regarded domestic 
service, the main occupation of women, as a very low status job. As 
natives of Jakarta, they may feel embarrassed in front of their 
relatives to accept work as a servant because it would lower their 
status. This problem did not apply to migrants because they lived 
away from their relatives. The reason given by Hull and Rahardjo for 
the non-participation of high status women thus applies also to the 
Betawi, that is the fear of lowering one's social status. It seems 
that a household servant’s job is an unfavourable one, even for a 
migrant. For a migrant this job is regarded as a temporary job before 
they get the desired job. This statement is backed up by findings 
which showed the proportion of household servants by duration of 
residence (Jones, 1977:Table 11 ). The short-duration migrants who 
worked were twice as likely to be household servants as were the 
longer-duration migrants (8). The proportion of longer-duration 
migrants from Vest and Central Java working as household servants is 
not much above that of the Jakarta - born, presumably because the 
longer-duration migrants had shifted to other, better jobs or because 
they had married and were no longer working.
(8) The same findings are revealed in a survey conducted among 
migrants in Jakarta in 1974 (Leknas, 1975:57).
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IV.2 Prospects for women's employment
Several reasons were advanced in an international meeting of 
experts in New York in 1973 (OECD, 1979) to explain the sharply 
increasing labour force participation rates of women. Among them were 
the changing structure of the job market, improved educational 
opportunities for women, technological development which can lighten 
the burden of work in the home, the intervention of government to 
reduce employment discrimination, changing public attitudes toward the 
role of women and the rising expectations of men and women both in 
terms of what they want in the way of material well being, and what 
they hope for in the way of satisfaction and fulfilment from their 
work. According to this report, the importance of each of these 
factors varies between countries.
It is not clear which of these factors apply to the Betawi, but 
since this study is a micro-level study, the discussion of prospects 
for employment of Betawi women will deal with public attitudes toward 
the role of women in terms of a woman's right to work outside the 
family circle and the husband's right to reject his wife's desire to 
work. Actually, the first two factors suggested in the OECD report, 
changing situation of job and improved educational opportunities for 
women, have been discussed briefly; it seems that these two factors 
were not associated with any change to the employment participation of 
Betawi women.
The evidence shows that public attitudes are very important as 
the first stage of a movement toward entry to paid employment. It was 
shown in the previous discussion that the low participation rate of
Page 81
women in the labour force in Muslim countries is related to the 
attitude toward the role of women (Youssef, 1971; White, 1978). For 
example, in Morocco, people disapproved of women working in activities 
which could be publicly seen. Public opinion whose verdict everybody 
fears was therefore censorious of women who worked (Forget,N, 
1967:106). Korson (1970-1) found that public attitudes had an 
important role even among educated people. He showed that this career 
constraint was more pronouced among Lahore students who were more 
conservative than Karachi students. Finally, Garza (1972) has proved 
that a mother's employment is related to the degree to which she 
perceives her family and neighbours as possessing favourable attitudes 
toward the employment of married females outside the home.
The proportion of Betawi who unconditionally agreed that women 
could work outside the family circle is not high (30 percent) compared 
to those who did not agree (48 percent) or agreed subject to 
conditions such as economic needs or husband's approval (Table IV.3)» 
Consistent with the previous finding that the men disapprove of women 
working outside the family circle, this table shows that men were much 
more likely to disagree with women working outside the family circle 
(62 percent) compared to women (35 percent). Both for single and 
married respondents, the proportion who disagreed was higher for men, 
but the difference between men and women was much larger for the 
married respondents. This may indicate that married men are concerned 
about their own reputation if their wives work. The implication is 
that it will be more difficult for married women to enter the labour 
force compared to single females. Thus, unless the age at first 
marriage increases and single women work before marriage, it is 
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increase dramatically in the near future.
As shown in the previous chapter, men tended to be more 
progressive in their attitudes, such as their attitudes toward 
education and early marriage. Why then does the reverse situation 
apply in respect to women's work? It is interesting that in developed 
countries also, a sex difference exists with regard to women's work; 
where women support liberal norms, men support traditional ones (de 
Lauwe, 1962; Dodd, 1973-74; Piotrowski, 1962; Safilios, 1970). Some 
authors suggest that the reason for the conservative attitude of males 
is probably to be sought in the anxiety felt by the husbands 
concerning their own status in the family, which is usually reinforced 
by religious and cultural values. Fear of acquisition of authority 
and financial independence by wives was stated explicitly in a survey 
conducted in Morocco (Forget,N, 1961:111-2). Even though Vieille 
stated that women in an extended family society cannot find economic 
independence through paid employment (cited from Forget,N, 1961:112), 
we still can see that men are afraid that women will acquire new 
authority, thus upsetting tradional role relations. The economic 
independence which wage earning brings to women is largely the reason 
for this attitude. If in a patrilineal society where male authority 
is an ascribed status, men worry that their status might be threatened 
by working women, this is even more the case in a bilateral society, 
such as the Betawi, where male authority is more an achieved status. 
These attitudes can be viewed in terms of the theory of family roles 
(Turner,R, 1970). Roles are reflected as rights and duties of 
individuals. According to Turner a family can be pictured as a system 
of roles, of who gets what roles and how they are distributed. The 
functions of the roles are to a great extent influenced by age, sex,
Page 84
kinship, occupational structure and the level of technology. For the 
existence and survival of the family unit, its functions are divided 
and grouped into roles and each member is cast in a particular set of 
roles. These roles are interdependent and mutually affect each other. 
Each family member then depends on the others playing their roles; 
the changing of one's role may change the role of the other. 
Consequently if a wife is employed, her employed role may bring about 
changes in the functions of father and children. There is 
considerable research on employed mothers in America, India and Europe 
which shows how the changing role of the mother has led to a role 
conflict and the changing of decision-making power, the husband-wife 
relationship, performance of household chores and other aspects of 
family life. Thus, to maintain the traditional position, status or 
power of each member, the traditional role has to persist.
As in other strict Muslim societies or more precisely uneducated 
strict Muslim societies, the roles of Betawi husbands and wives have 
been defined customarily and religiously. The husband is the head of 
the household, the breadwinner and the decision maker. By not 
permitting wives to enter employment, men can maintain their position. 
Thus as long as a wife's employment is harmful to her husband's 
position, men are less likely to give their agreement. Education, 
which takes place while a girl is single, does not obviously present 
the same threat to role relationships and so it is less subject to 
control. These statements tend to be supported by findings revealed 
in Table IV.3, when the attitude of men is compared to that of women 
according to their characteristics. It is interesting to note that 
the proportion who disapprove of women working is lowest for young 
women of low economic status. On the other hand, the proportion of
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men in the same category who disapprove is the highest in the table. 
For this group, the issue of wives working may have greatest relevance 
with the wife wishing to work to improve the family's economic 
situation but the husband wishing to maintain the traditional roles. 
The most consistent differences in the table were those by education 
level with those of higher education, irrespective of age and sex, 
being less likely to disapprove of wives working. But unlike better 
educated females whose disapproval of working wives is low, the 
proportion disapproving is still quite high for male respondents. So 
there might be an important reason for men not permitting their wives 
to work, and even education could not affect this attitude very much. 
It seems that support given to education of girls by their fathers may 
therefore be a future source of strain in husband-wife relationships 
if the wife wants to work.
The other traditional family custom which has discouraged women 
from working is related to the norms of the extended family. For 
example, it is an unquestioned family duty that a widow or divorced 
women is received in her father's or brother's home, or in an uncle's 
or cousin's. She, therefore, does not have to support herself 
(Djamour, 1979; Dodd,P, 1968; Muhammad, 1980) (9)»
Even though women may have liberal attitudes about work, they 
still recognized the power of their husband in the household (Table 
IV.4). Almost all the respondents recognized the husband's right to 
decide whether his wife works or not. Thus, even though women 
themselves may have a liberal attitude toward work, their recognition
(9) The marriage survey showed that 84 percent of divorced women moved 
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of their husband's right as decision-maker will serve to preserve the 
low participation rate of women in the labour force as long as men 
maintain their conservative attitudes.
If education is compared to employment, a question can be raised: 
"what is the role of education in changing the position of women 
compared to their position in terms of labour force participation?" 
Related to this question, a similar question has been raised by Mintz 
(1971:267-8) :
"Who is more modern, more western, more developed : a 
Yoruba market women who daily risks her security and her 
capital in vigorous individual competition with others like 
herself; or a Smith College graduate who spends her days 
ferrying her husband to the Westport railroad station and 
her children to ballet classes?
In this respect, Hull (1975) warned that we should not ignore the fact 
that the poor women are working because they have to, not out of 
choice. While the independence and self reliance of these women in 
some ways make them the archetypal 'liberated women', their poverty 
prevents them from having a full range of life choices and thus their 
'independence' loses much of its meaning. The other category of 
working women are those who are working by choice as an alternative 
way of life. Their roles as wife and mother are partially transferred 
to other institutions. So, there are two categories of working women 
in contrast to non-working women. Garza (1972) also stated that as 
long as a woman's motivation is not to seek satisfaction from work, or 
see it as a means of developing her personality or as an essential 
instrument of emancipation, a high female participation rate does not 
bring about a radical transformation of the status of women or their 
emancipation from their traditional role. But based on the theory of
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resources and the theory of roles which states that female employment 
creates a different role and even independence, it seems that mothers 
who are working for economic reasons still have a better position than 
those not working, perhaps even much better. Further research is 
required on the status of voluntary as compared to compulsorily 
employed women.
It can be concluded that if employment, as postulated by many 
authors, can bring a radical change in the position of women, then the 
Betawi women gain very little advantage from this process, since 
almost all of them were not working. There are a number of factors 
contributing to this situation. First, their concern about their 
social status does not allow them to take a low status job while on 
the other hand their poor education does not allow them to get a high 
status job. Second, for men, the ideal wife does not work because the 
husband has the role of breadwinner, and furthermore the decision 
maker on this matter is the husband. Third, the traditional custodial 
function of the extended family inhibits women from working. Fourth, 
the primary factor motivating women to work is not to bring about 
emancipation, although motivation may not be greatly important if one 
subscribes to the theories of power and roles. Fifth, the Betawi are 
strict Muslims and Islam is known to be associated with low employment 
rates of women, even though some surveys have shown that education and 
religion do not always have the influence attributed to them. Thus, 
unless there are changes in the traditional roles of family members, 
the proportion of Betawi women who are working will change very
slowly.
CHAPTER V
F A M I L Y  P O S I T I O N
Most studies of women in Muslim societies show that their 
position in marriage is usually remains traditional even after their 
position in education and employment has substantially changed. Women 
may have the same opportunity as men for participating in education 
and employment, but their rights in marriage are subordinated to those 
of men. This might be caused by the fact that, next to religion, the 
institution of the family is the slowest to change. It has often been 
found therefore that improvement of education and employment 
participation for females leads to conflict within a family. This 
conflict is more likely to appear in a traditional, Muslim, male 
oriented society, where the roles of men and women are strictly 
determined. The dilemma for both men and women is how to reconcile 
the man's self image as the dominant authority to the woman’s emerging 
self image as an equal. Moreover in Muslim countries, as many authors 
have argued, inequalities between men and women are institutionalized 
in family law to the extent that White (1978) used this factor to make 
a ranking of the position of women in various Muslim countries.
White found that there were two types of restrictions operating 
to affect women's status in Muslim societies : first, the legal 
restrictions and inequalities mentioned in the Qur'an, hadith, sunnah 
and shariah legal codes which include inequality in inheritance, 
marriage, divorce, child custody and the ability to serve as witnesses 
and second, purdah or seclusion. In this study, the discussion will
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deal only with marriage and divorce since it is felt that these two 
factors most seriously affect the position of women in Indonesia. 
Specifically, we shall examine age at marriage, mate selection, 
polygyny and divorce. Articulation of the issue of women's rights in 
marriage began with an Indonesian woman patriot and reformer, R.A. 
Kartini in the nineteenth century and continued with the formation of 
women’s organizations which held congresses in 1928, 1935, 1938, 1941, 
1950, 1952 and 1953 (Kartowijono, 1976; Soeroto, 1978; Soewondo, 
1962; Stuers, I960).
V.I Age at First Marriage
In some societies, the religious life has been considered to be 
higher than the married state, but in Islam, celibacy has always been 
condemned, and all Muslims are expected to marry, almost as religious 
duty. There are no restrictions on age at marriage in Islam, but a 
person is expected to marry once he/she has passed puberty. In Muslim 
society therefore, there is a tendency, especially for girls, to be 
married in late childhood or at puberty (l). This practice means 
that a girl's chance of being educated or having a choice in life role 
is limited, so the introduction of an age restriction for marriage is 
a step in freeing women from this restriction.
(l) In six provinces in Indonesia, the age at first marriage was 
higher among the Christians; this applied for urban and rural 
areas and low and high education (Muliakusuma, 1976: 20-21).
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Prior to 1974 there was no age limit on marriage for Muslims in 
Indonesia, but there was for Christian Indonesians (2). An age limit 
on first marriage for Muslims in Indonesia was introduced in the new 
Marriage Law which was promulgated in January 1974 and became 
effective in October 1975. This law was an attempt to unify the 
diverse legal systems which regulated Indonesian familial matters (3)« 
However, the introduction of the Bill provoked demonstrations and 
disputes, both within and outside the parliament, and polemics and 
debates in magazines and newspapers. This challenge to the new law 
came from the Muslims since some points of the Bill were considered to 
violate Islamic Law concerning divorce, polygyny, registration of 
marriage, interreligious marriage, adoption, betrothal and the kinship 
system. A working committee to resolve this problem was formed but 
they failed , and so the offending clauses were dropped (4).
The principle of the minimum age at marriage was commonly 
accepted; the minimum age was 19 for boys and 16 for girls. Among 
the Betawi, marriage below these minimum ages was more common for 
girls than for boys as 45 percent of girls compared to 22 percent of 
boys married below what are now the legal minimum ages. But these
figures were not precise, since most of Betawi did not really know
(2) . The age at first marriage for Christians was 18 for boys and 15
for girls (Prodjodikoro, 1967: 35).
(3) The history of this Marriage Law can be found in Katz and Katz 
(1978) whilst the collection of Marriage Law in Indonesia can be 
found in Bakry, K.H.B. (1978).
(4) . See, for example, TEMPO (Indonesian Magazine), in
1973 : 30 June, 8 Sept, 29 Sept, 20 Oct, 29 Dec.
1974 : 26 January
1975 : 3 May, March, 24 May
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their exact age. But they do serve to show roughly the proportions in 
various categories of age at first marriage.
Although age at first marriage has been increasing for females, 
early marriage still existed among those in the youngest age group in 
1978 (Table V.1). The Betawi women, however, did not think of 
themselves as marrying early as almost 79 percent said that their age 
at marriage was average (normal) for the Betawi community (Table V.2). 
Fifty three percent of male respondents who stated that their age at 
first marriage was higher than usual, mentioned economic reasons as 
the cause whilst 56 percent of female respondents stated no partner or 
no proposal. Thirty percent of male respondents and 50 percent of 
females who regarded their age at first marriage as lower than usual 
stated that they were married off by parents as the reason. The 
youngest age at first marriage was 8 for girls and 14 for boys. 
Whatever their age at first marriage was , the survey shows that they 
consumated the marriage at once. Generally, girls were married 
between the ages of 14-18 (81 percent) and boys between 18-25 (78 
percent). Age at first marriage has been increasing for females only; 
the median age at first marriage was 15*7 for females aged less than 
thirty, 15*2 for those aged 30-44 and 14.7 for those aged more than 
45» The corresponding values for males were 20.9, 20.8 and 20.8. One 
of the reasons contributing to increased age at first marriage was
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V.2 Rights of women in mate selection
Like many other developing countries, early marriage and arranged 
marriage was more likely to occur among women; also marriage was 
considered more important in the lives of women. These statements are 
supported in terms of age at marriage for the Betawi in the previous 
section. Table V.3 and Table V.4 also show that the proportion who 
were married off by their parents was higher for females. It seems 
that this situation still exists because 15 percent of single female 
respondents stated that they had been pressed to marry by their 
parents . Even though the frequency of arranged marriage has been 
declining for both men and women, the trend has been faster and has 
been led by men.
The impression reflected in Table V.3 is that the extent of self 
choice of spouse is quite high. Obviously, what they meant by "self 
choice" was parents' choice with children's consent as reflected in 
Table V.4 where 49 percent of male respondents had never met their 
future wife, while the corresponding proportion was 54 percent for 
female respondents. Arranged marriage or self choice with parents' 
consent are the common forms of marriage in Muslim societies. The 
Indonesian Marriage bill reflects this in stating :"In order to enter 
into matrimony a person who has not attained 21 years shall obtain the 
consent of both parents". Based on knowledge of Betawi society, 
however, it is likely that there were very few instances of self 
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The difference in the right of mate selection between males and 
females disappeared in remarriage, perhaps for religious reasons. 
According to Islam, a woman must have a guardian (wali) in her first 
marriage but not for subsequent marriages. This rule does not apply 
for males.
The level of education seems to have had little effect on mate 
selection. This might be due to the relatively low levels of 
education attained. It has been shown by findings in other countries, 
that education per se has a direct impact on deviation from 
traditional marriage arrangement only when schooling continues beyond 
puberty (Fox,G.L., 1975; Che Mat, 1979; Hull, 1975; Mohammad, 
1979; Zallaluddin, 1980). Two reasons are stated as explanation for 
this observation : first when the girl's level of education is low 
she is unable to counter her parents' power and second, low levels of 
education provide no opportunity for social intercourse.
Rapid social change has taken place in the matter of social 
intercourse before marriage as only 2 percent of single respondents 
stated that social intercourse was impossible compared to 38 percent 
among the married respondents. Looking at the differences by age, it 
seems that this social change was faster for males (Table V.5)* As a 
result, the chance for mixing with the opposite sex was always higher 
for males (Table V.6). While the proportion who stated that social 
intercourse in their village was rather free was quite low, it is 
interesting that the proportion who stated that the opportunity to mix 
with the opposite sex should be freer was also low especially among 
females (Table V.7). On the other hand, the proportion who stated
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young was very high (Table V.8). More than half (65 percent) were of 
the opinion that this change was bad, and the proportion disapproving 
was higher for men. In fact, the proportion who said that the change 
to freer mixing of the sexes was a good trend was twice as high for 
women. Again, women were more liberal in attitude, but less free in 
practice. Most of the Betawi, male and female, who said that this 
social change was bad, blamed education and modern trends derived from 
the west. Forty percent of respondents who blamed modern trends 
derived from the West as the reason for this undesirable change, 
stated that this factor has created non-religious children, whilst 
almost none spoke favourably about the effects of education. Some of 
them said that the reason "was not enough commitment to religion', but 
younger men were less likely to mention decline in commitment to 
religion. Thus, while western commentators may think that education, 
industrialization, modernization and westernization are the important 
factors for social change in respect of improving the position of 
women, the people themselves think that these factors have brought 
undesirable changes in their society. The same situation was also 
observed in some states of Malaysia (Che Mat, 1979; Mohammad, 
1979; Zallaluddin, 1980).
V. 3 Divorce and Polygyny
Divorce and polygyny in Islam are frequently condemned as causes 
of the lower position of women. According to Islam, a man can divorce 
his wife by simply saying "I divorce you", but a woman can only ask 
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most people are unanimous that polygyny lowers the position of women, 
there are opinions to the contrary. It is said:
"For the wife polygamy is a liberating force. Thanks to the 
presence of her co-wives, it is possible for her to free 
herself at regular intervals from the chores of married life 
and thus, from time to time, rediscover the freedom to use 
her time for her personal concerns and to fulfill her own 
desires " (Nomeyo, 1967:232 cited in Ware, 1979:190).
"While monogamy may raise a woman’s status in her own eyes, 
since it corrects an imbalance of opportunities between the 
sexes, it may also lower some aspects of her overall 
position in the social system. Also monogamy as practised 
in the major Eurasian societies raises the status of some 
women but lowers that of other, e.g. concubines (Clignet, 
1970:179-80).
"One is to argue that monogamous marriage represents a more 
modern westernized form in which spouses are more equal, 
and, therefore, wives have greater opportunities for 
participating in decision making. The other view argues 
that wives in polygynous unions have greater freedom 
precisely because they are not in one to one relationship 
with their spouse" (Ware, 1979:191)»
A representative of the Indonesian Women's Congress during the debate 
on the Marriage Law argued that polygyny is necessary since men are by 
nature ’polygamous' referring to the practice of keeping mistresses. 
She also claimed that polygyny should be legal to allow for the case 
of women who cannot bear children, since having children is one of the 
remedies for a harmonious home (Hull, 1975:109)»
Based on these arguments it seems that there is no simple 
relationship between polygyny and the status of women. It is not 
always true that societies which practice polygyny place little value 
on women (see discussion on page 10). Obviously, the best way to 
measure the Betawi position on polygyny is to ask the people
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themselves what they think about it.
Since Islam allows polygyny, most authors are unanimous that 
Islam contributes to the high rate of polygyny, but it is interesting 
that polygyny is also quite prominent in some non-Muslim countries. 
Pell (1979 - cited from Ware, 1979) has argued that religious 
prohibitions have a limited effect in a culture where polygyny is 
widely accepted. In reverse, therefore, even where religion provides 
for polygyny, the incidence of polygyny is still likely to be low in 
societies which are culturally monogamous.
While there are different opinions about whether polygyny has 
lowered the position of women or not, there is more of a concensus 
that easy access to divorce on the part of husbands has lowered the 
position of women. During the present century, women's organizations 
in Indonesia have demanded that both easy divorce and polygyny be 
abolished, but since most Muslims consider these demands to be counter 
to Islam, results have been achieved only with great difficulty.
Whilst the leaders of women's organizations did their utmost to 
abolish easy divorce and scientists have hotly debated that divorce 
lowers the position of women, among the Betawi, only 38 percent of 
respondents regarded divorce as a disgrace (Table V.9) (5)» It seems 
also that socio-economic characteristics had no effect on their 
attitude, even though the better educated females were less likely
(5) Research conducted by Mohammed and Che Mat revealed that none of 
their Malay respondents stated that divorce was a disgrace, whilst 
Zallaluddin in another state of Malaysia showed that only 18 
percent of respondents said that divorce was a disgrace .Like the 
Betawi, the respondents in these studies were generally poorly 
educated, came from a low economic class and were Muslim (Che Mat, 
1979; Mohammad, 1979; Zallaluddin, 1980).
Pugo 100
Table V.9
Response to Questions: (a) "In This Society, is Divorce RegardeJ as a Normal or a Bad Thing?"







Male Female Total <30 30-44 45* Total <30 30-44 45+ Total Sexes Male Female Sexes
(a) Divorce is a normal occurrence 27 26 26 23 30 26 27 26 30 18 26 26 27 26 26
Divorce is not so good 38 41 39 18 20 23 20 39 39 46 40 31 23 40 32
Divorce is a disgrace 20 15 17 55 48 51 51 35 31 35 34 42 45 31 38
No reply 16 18 17 3 3 - 2 * - 1 • 1 5 3 4
Total 101 100 99 99 101 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(b) Polygyny is good if you arc
able (wealthy) 51 35 43 38 54 S3 50 48 48 51 48 49 SO 48 48
Polygyny is not good: not
enough attention for children 2 6 4 - - - . 3 3 5 3 3 ‘ 3 3
- leads to problems between
wives 11 10 10 5 S 7 6 6 7 4 6 6 7 7 7
- cost, management
difficult 3 3 3 11 7 4 7 1 3 3 2 4 6 2 4
- wife suffers/not equally
treated 22 16 19 31 25 24 26 24 19 14 21 23 25 20 22
- other reasons 12 30 21 16 9 12 11 19 20 24 20 16 11 20 17
Total 101 100 100 101 100 100 100 101 100 101 100 101 99 100 101
(101) (105) (206) (103) (190) (137) (430) (231) (174) (102) (507) (937) (531) (612) (1143)
Proportion of respondents saying divorce 
by socio-economic characteristic








Divorce is normal - no schooling * * 28 28 36 27 30 30
- some primary 28 25 26 24 18 23 24
- completed primary or more 27 27 27 24 # * 23 25
- lower economic class 20 29 25 27 35 30 28
- higher economic class 31 27 29 28 22 26 27
- non-wage employee 28 26 27 - - - -
- wage employee 27 27 27 - - - -
- lower religiosity 24 31 27 28 27 28
- higher religiosity 42 25 31 37 23 30
Polynyny is good - no schooling * * 48 45 62 46 52 49
- some primary 55 SS 55 43 56 46 58
- completed primary or more 39 63 47 46 * 46 46
- lower economic class 45 54 50 54 S3 54 52
- higher economic class 44 58 52 47 50 48 50
- non-wage employee 50 53 52 - - - -
- wage employee 40 57 45 - - - -
- lower religiosity 38 47 42 51 47 49 46
- higher religiosity 60 b2 62 55 57 56 59
* *
less than 0.5 per cent 
N less than 10.
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to regard divorce as a normal thing. The proportion who stated that 
divorce was a normal occurrence was similar for men and women 
irrespective of age or marital status. Married men, however were more 
likely to consider divorce to be a disgrace. In fact, 14 percent of 
male and 16 percent of female respondents aged 45 and over had been 
divorced, a relatively high level compared to some other parts of 
Indonesia where the same survey was conducted (6).
There were three types of divorce reported by respondents :
- talak: where the husband divorces his wife
-khula : Where the wife applies to religious court for a divorce.
The court then summons the husband to the court and asks 
whether he agrees to divorce his wife .
- fasakh : a divorce granted by a judge of the Islamic court in cases
of desertion or continued failure of the husband to 
provide maintenance. Usually, the wife asks for the 
divorce.
It is interesting that there was no consistency between the types 
of divorce stated by male and female respondents (Table V.10). The 
proportion of males who stated talak was double that given by females. 
On the other hand, the proportion of females who stated fasakh was 
four times that given by males. It is unclear which was right, but 
again it is evident that both sexes tend to give answers which place 
their own position higher.
(6) The divorce rate for females aged more than 45 was 1 percent 
in Aceh, 9 percent in South Sumatra, 4 percent in Bali, 12 percent 
in South Kalimantan and 6 percent in South Sulawesi.
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The most frequent reasons given for divorce were an unharmonized 
relationship (30 percent -- this covers "wife did not obey her 
husband", "no agreement between husband and wife", "no understanding" 
and "did not like each other anymore") and matrimonial reasons (26 
percent—  this covers "spouse had love affair", "jealous" and 
"polygyny"). The first reason was much more pronounced among men 
whilst the second reason was more frequently stated by women. Thirty 
percent of the men classified under unharmonized relationship stated 
that their wives did not obey them while 71 percent of female 
respondents included under matrimonial reasons mentioned polygyny. 
Only two males attributed their divorce to their own polygyny. Health 
reasons were the third mentioned reason (13 percent -- this covers 
"physical sickness" and "childlessness". For most of the men stating 
this type of reason, the cause was childlessness while no women 
mentioned childlessness. Interference by in-laws and social reasons 
(gambling, irresponsibility and prolonged absence) were much more 
pronounced reasons among females. Thus the most important reasons 
given by males were disharmony, wife's disobedience, jealousy and 
childlessness whilst the most important reasons given by women were 
polygyny, disharmony and sickness.
The reasons for divorce permitted by the new Indonesian Marriage 
Law are : first, if one of the parties commits adultery, becomes a 
drunkard, an opium addict, a gambler or addicted to other vices which 
are hard to cure; second, if one of the parties has left the other 
for two consecutive years without the other's consent and without 
legitimate reason or because of reasons over which the other party has 
no control; third, one of the parties has to undergo a jail sentence 
of five years or more after the marriage; fourth, one of the parties
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resorts to violence or ill treatment that can endanger the safety of 
the other; fifth, one of the parties develops an incurable disease or 
disability which prevents the consummation of marriage between husband 
and wife; sixth, if constant quarrels and heated arguments develop 
between husband and wife which preclude the desired compatibility. In 
fact, only three of these six reasons were found among the Betawi, 
that is, the first reason (7 percent), fifth reason (13 percent) and 
sixth reason (30 percent). Childlessness and polygyny, frequently 
mentioned causes of divorce among the Betawi, are not permissible 
reasons for divorce under the law. Thus it can be said that the new 
law has improved the position of women since a husband cannot divorce 
his wife in order to take another wife or in the case where the 
marriage is childless.
Before any further discussion about divorce and polygyny in 
relation to the position of women, the rate of polygyny among the 
Betawi should be considered. To determine the incidence of polygyny, 
two questions were asked, whether the husband already had a wife at 
the time of the marriage, and second, whether that husband took 
another wife or wives during the marriage. In this way, a distinction 
was made between women who became co-wives upon marrying and those 
whose marriage became polygynous after a period of monogamy. The two 
together provide the rate of polygyny.
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Table V.11
The Rate of Polygyny in some provinces in Indonesia, 1978
South
Betawi Bali Yogyakarta Kalimantan
Co-wives upon marrying 2. 2 0.3 1.2 2.6
Marriage became polygynous 3.8 2.5 1.9 2.6
TOTAL 6.0 2.8 3.1 5.2
It seems that polygyny among the Betawi was relatively frequent 
compared to other areas, even though we know that in some countries 
the rate was higher. To assess whether the Betawi women have a bad 
position in terms of polygyny, their attitude toward polygyny will be 
discussed. The comparison between attitudes to polygyny and the rate 
of polygyny provides better scope for analysis.
As stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Indonesian Marriage Law, 
polygyny is permitted under three conditions. These are the approval 
by the wife or wives; the assurance that the husband will guarantee 
the necessities of life for all wives and children and the guarantee 
that the husband shall act justly in regard to his wives and their 
children. The possibilities that might arise from this situation are 
first, that the wife will never agree if her husband takes a second 
wife and second, that the husband cannot fulfill the two guarantees.
The result of these two situations will be constant quarrels and
heated arguments between husband and wife giving rise to the
possibility that this factor will be used (particularly by the 
husband) as a reason for divorce. Hence, most Betawi male respondents 
stated constant quarrels and heated arguments as their reason for
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divorce whilst the female respondents stated polygyny. In other words 
practice of polygyny leads to marital discord and dissolution, at 
least among the Betawi. This means that restrictions upon polygyny 
will never improve the position of women as long as divorce is easily 
obtained. In order to take another woman the husband will divorce his 
wife. Thus instead of improving the situation, the law may will put 
women into an undesirable position (7).
Related to this discussion there is a proverb in Indonesia :"It 
is better to become a second wife than to be divorced." In fact, only 
14 percent of women agree with this statement (Table V.12), which 
means implicitly that they reject polygyny. The proportion of men who 
accept polygyny was much higher. There was no difference between ages 
for women but younger married men were more likely to oppose polygyny. 
This impression was quite interesting since a higher proportion, 
especially for females, regarded polygyny as a good thing (Table V.9)* 
As for divorce, there was no pattern of attitude toward polygyny based 
on socio-economic characteristics, but the more religious people were 
more likely to approve of polygyny.
(7) An actual case, for example, a married captain intended to take a 
second wife. The first wife was persuaded by her friends to 
oppose this since polygyny was prohibited for the Indonesian army. 
As a result, the first wife was divorced so that the husband can 
marry another woman without contravening the rule. Also Parkezi 
(1978: 221) found that the Family Protection Law introduced in
Iran in 1967 did not improve the position of Iranian women as it 
should. She said that financial and social depedency of the wife 
had forced her to give her consent for her husband to take a 
second wife since few women want to be divorced, left unsupported 
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The response of women might be regarded as contrary to 
expectation as it may have been expected that women would prefer 
polygyny rather than divorce (as in the case of Iran). This 
expectation is based on the fact that generally the Betawi women did 
not work outside the family circle so that they had no income to 
support themselves (Chapter IV). Glick (1973)» for example, has
argued that increasing opportunities for women outside the home might 
be one of the contributing factors to divorce, and Hart (1976*1 also 
suggested that participation of women in the economic sector was the 
most important factor in the increasing divorce rate in Britain. On 
the other hand, Pearson and Hendrix (1975) found that the few 
opportunities for women outside the home, besides the great authority 
of the husband, has contributed to low divorce rates in pre-industrial 
cities. Similar findings were observed by Cohen (1961), Lloyd (1968) 
and Netting (1969)* In short, economic resources available to women 
increase their behavioural autonomy, which implies a reduction of 
their dependence on their husband and thereby a reduction in the 
marital power differential. The increase of autonomy and reduced 
dependence are then seen as factors directly affecting divorce. So, 
divorce is a function of women's opportunities to achieve an economic 
standard comparable to that of men. This expected response was 
strengthened by the finding that only 12 percent of divorced women 
with children said that the father had supported the children after 
divorce, although 32 percent of divorced men claimed that they had 
supported their children. This means that divorced wives had to 
support themselves and their children. However, since 83 percent of 
divorced women returned to their parents' home after divorce, the 
economic problem mentioned above may not have been a major obstacle.
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V.4 Image of women in society
"As we have pointed out elsewhere, 
our societies have long remained 
attached to the 'myth' of virility 
and to the idea of man's 
biological, psychological, legal 
and spiritual superiority" (de 
Lauwe, 1962:12).
Sanday (1975) tried to explain this phenomenon by using Dunham's 
conceptual analysis of the relationship between energy interchange and 
some basic properties of primate social organization. Generalizing 
Dunham’s discussion to human society, it is assumed that to meet the 
goal of social survival, humans will expand energy in three component 
tasks : reproduction, defence and subsistence. Of course, the role 
of reproduction will always fall to the women. This imposes a 
constraint on the proportion of the total female energy which can be 
utilized in other activities thus increasing the probability that the 
other two tasks will draw more on the energy of males in such a way as 
to achieve maximum utilization of energy from both. Thus, initially 
men have higher status relative to women in the economic and political 
spheres (Sanday, 1975). Furthermore, as stated in marital power 
theory, they automatically have higher status in familial matters as 
well. Most findings show that the participation of women in the 
economic and political spheres will improve their decision making 
power in the family. Unless they change their roles, men and women 
will live in two different worlds, the former exercising complete 
authority within the larger society, the latter affirming their 
position through marriage and childbearing. Thus the image of the 
ideal male is characterized as provider, protector, patriarch, 
superior whilst the ideal female is dependent, chaste and fertile.
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Obviously the image of married women solely performing a 
reproduction function has survived among the Betawi as reflected in 
Table V.13 which shows that 89 percent of respondents stated that a 
widow should remarry as soon as possible. The proportion was the same 
for all age groups, but was slightly lower for female respondents. If 
it was known that the widow could not have any more children, then the 
proportion advocating remarriage dropped to 59 percent. Also when 
they were asked at what age a widow need not remarry, most gave the 
age of menopause. Again there were no differences between age groups, 
which means that this image has survived through time.
Table V.14 indicates the rights of husbands compared to wives in 
terms of the right to give or ask for divorce. The questions used 
referred to the respondent's view rather than to legal rights. It is 
known that in Muslim countries the wife has less power in the area of 
divorce. Obviously this has applied among the Betawi, but it was more 
pronounced when the marital problem was a sensitive problem because it 
was associated with male honour. The variables in this table have 
been arranged from the least to the most sensitive problem. It 
reveals that the percentage who agree that a wife has a right to ask 
for a divorce from her husband was always smaller than the proportion 
of respondents who recognized that a husband has the right to divorce 
his wife, even though the reasons for divorce were exactly the same. 
Also the more sensitive the problem was, the bigger the difference 
between the husband's and the wife's rights. It was interesting that 
this was acknowledged by both men and women which implies that women 
themselves recognized that men had more power in the area of divorce. 
The same image that husbands are more powerful than wives was also 
revealed in the employment discussion, where 58 percent of female
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respondents compared to 30 percent of male respondents agreed that a 
married women could work outside the family circle, but 96 percent of 
female respondents compared to 94 percent of male respondents stated 
that a husband has the right to forbid his wife to work outside the 
family circle. In fact, only 2 percent of female respondents did work 
at the time of survey. The comparison between image and fact can also 
be seen in the case of divorce where the spouse was sterile. Both men 
and women recognized that the wife as well as the husband has a right 
to divorce if one of them was sterile (Table V.14). In fact, this 
right was only exercised by men (Table V.10) where 12 percent of male 
respondents gave childlessness as their reason for divorce, while no 
female respondents did so.
It can be concluded that early marriage was found among females 
only and even though the rate of early marriage was decreasing, it was 
still quite evident among the youngest age group (less than 30). Men 
also had superior rights in mate selection, and better opportunities 
to mix with the opposite sex. Although social intercourse prior to 
marriage was limited among the Betawi, most were of the opinion that 
there was much greater freedom than before and this was regarded as a 
bad thing. Modern trends derived from the West were blamed for this 
trend. Generally, arranged marriage among the Betawi was relatively 
low, but was much more common for females.
Almost all women rejected polygyny saying they would prefer to be 
divorced rather than have their husband take a second wife, but on the 
other hand polygyny is allowed by their religion and because of this 
it was regarded as a good thing by half of them. In fact, the rate of 
polygyny for the Betawi was the highest among other surveyed areas in
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Indonesia. Thus, even though some have argued that polygyny might 
give a high position to women, this was not the case for the Betawi. 
The divorce rate was also high and divorced women were in a 
disadvantaged position : they chose divorce because they could not 
choose the alternative, polygyny. Their religion allows divorce and 
so only one-third of the society regarded divorce as a disgraceful 
thing and both men and women recognized the superior power of husbands 
in divorce. Obviously the new Marriage Law could not do as much as 
was expected because divorce and polygyny are related strongly to 
religion. As a matter of fact, what the new marriage law has done is 
to offer women two alternatives, to be divorced or let their husband 
take a second wife, perhaps a choice not all that different from their 
situation before the new law was promulgated.
It was noteworthy that this survey revealed that women were often 
likely to have liberal attitudes but in practice men were the more 
powerful. The other point was that both men and women tended to make 
statements which put their own position higher. This implies that in 
this male oriented society, the women wished to have a better position 
while the men strived to maintain their position. Ironically, women 
as well as men recognized the men's superiority, at least in family
affairs.
CHAPTER VI
C O N C L U S I O N
Previous studies have shown that education, employment, religion, 
industrialization and urbanization influence the position of women. 
Hence, it is interesting to consider the position of Betawi women 
since on the one hand they live in a metropolitan city with high and 
rapid urbanization and industrialization but on the other hand they 
are generally strict Muslims, have low education and come from the low 
economic class. For this study, three indicators have been chosen : 
education, employment and marriage behaviour. The first two factors 
were chosen as they usually lead to a higher position for women while 
the third was chosen because it was shown that in many Muslim 
countries even women who have a good position in terms of education 
and employment still have a poor position in marriage.
This study has attempted to consider three questions : first, 
what is the position of Betawi women relative to other women in 
Jakarta; second, what is the extent of social change in the position 
of Betawi women between generations given the rapid urbanization in 
Jakarta; third, has the position of Betawi women in terms of 
education and employment changed more than has their position in
marriage.
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VI. 1 The position of Betawi women in education, employment 
and marriage
Compared with other women in Jakarta, the educational 
participation of Betawi women was low. In fact, this difference also 
applied between the Betawi men and other men in Jakarta, but the 
difference was greater for females. In other words, compared to the 
Betawi men, the education level of women was lower. The difference 
between the Betawi men and women also related to informal education 
and general knowledge. In fact, the usage of mass media which was 
regarded as an indicator of informal education and the general 
knowledge of the Betawi was low.
The education level of younger women was higher but was still low 
compared to other women in Jakarta. While the rate of increase in 
education was faster for the Betawi, half of them went to religious 
schools. In fact, only a few of them, even among the youngest 
respondents had been to senior secondary school and none had received 
tertiary education. As in many developing countries, the economic 
reason was the prominent factor hampering education. For women, there 
were two other prominent factors apart from the economic reason, 
namely early marriage and the incidence of religious schooling.
The participation of women in the labour force is very low and 
this has not changed through time. The participation of Betawi women 
in the labour force is considerably lower than that of other women in 
Jakarta. The limited opportunities for work in Jakarta and the 
limited skills of the Betawi women have contributed to this situation
but the attitude toward working women, as the first step to entering
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the labour force, has been the principal limiting factor. Men are 
regarded by the Betawi as the decision makers on this matter and they 
were unlikely to let their wives work outside the family circle. This 
attitude has not changed through time.
The rate of early marriage was quite high for women, but not for 
men and this was also reflected in the reasons for late marriage where 
the prominent reason for women was no proposal, whilst for men it was 
their economic situation.
Since there were no data on divorce and polygyny in Jakarta, the 
comparison between the Betawi and the non-Betawi refers to women in 
other provinces in Indonesia. The Betawi had the highest rates of 
both divorce and polygyny, not surprising given their poor education, 
low economic situation and strict adherence to Islam, but which of 
these factors contributed most to the high rates of divorce and 
polygyny is unclear. It seems that Islam has contributed to this 
situation as the more highly religious respondents were more likely to 
regard both divorce and polygyny as a normal occurrence.
Betawi men were in a superior position in regard to social 
interaction before marriage, mate selection and divorce with more 
rights than women in these matters. In fact, social interaction 
before marriage was very limited among the Betawi but most Betawi were 
of the opinion that it was much freer than before and they were 
opposed to any further freedom. This was considered as a bad thing; 
for this, the Western style of life was blamed.
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Men were more liberal in their attitude toward education for 
girls. The proportion of married men who considered that education 
was more important for a young girl was twice the proportion who took 
the opposite view. Women, on the other hand, were split almost 
equally on whether early marriage or education is more important. 
Men's attitudes were also changing more rapidly on this issue, so 
there may be some potential for improvement in the future.
In contrast to the more liberal attitude of men in regard to 
education, they were quite conservative in their attitude toward 
working women. On the other hand, women were more liberal on this 
matter. Three times as many men disapproved of wives working outside 
the family circle as those who approved, whilst for women the 
proportion was in balance. But both men and women recognized that the 
husband was more powerful in this matter so the very low participation 
of Betawi women in the labour force is understandable. Attitudes 
about the rights of husbands in this matter had not changed across 
generations.
Men and women had similar opinions about polygyny and divorce 
with about half saying that polygyny and divorce in their society were 
regarded as normal occurrences. Offerred a choice between polygyny 
and divorce for a woman, almost all women prefer divorce whilst only 
half of the men had the same opinion. This research therefore did not 
support the viewpoint that polygyny can improve the position of women 
as most women were opposed to it. Both men and women recognized that 
husbands had more power and rights in respect of divorce. So no 
matter what the women's attitude was, the decision was more likely in 
the man's hands. Women are in a further disadvantaged position in
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divorce since husbands generally do not accept responsibility for the 
support of their former wives or their children following divorce. 
Thus both in polygyny and divorce they were in an unfavourable 
situation.
In brief it can be concluded that the position of Betawi women in 
terms of education, employment and marriage was inferior compared to 
other women in Jakarta and other areas in Indonesia. For women, there 
was only minor social change in education between generations despite 
the rapid urbanization and industrialization in Jakarta. While there 
was an increasing rate of participation in education this was 
restricted mainly to primary education in religious schools. There 
was no social change at all in womens' employment participation. It 
was not possible to measure trends in the rates of divorce or polygyny 
because of the small numbers but attitudes have not changed through 
time.
While women's education levels were low, their position with 
respect to education was better than that for employment and marriage. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the apparent potential for social 
change evident in attitudes toward these aspects of the position of 
women. It is held by social psychologists that changes in the 
personality structure of individuals precede changes in the social 
structure of the community. The ultimate units of any social
structure are the individuals and unless their thought patterns 
undergo modification, no social change is possible. As shown in the 
previous chapters, there was a large apparent change in attitudes 
toward education, but not in attitudes toward working women and 
marriage behaviour. But, it is noteworthy that the scarcity of
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education facilities in Jakarta and the poor economic condition of the 
Betawi have brought the Betawi into a disadvantaged position in terms 
of competition for education. However, the changing attitudes toward 
education have put the Betawi women in a better position with respect 
to education when compared to their position in terms of employment 
and marriage.
VI.2 Prospects for the improvement of the position of women.
The Betawi have a very limited chance to improve their education, 
because of the the scarcity of education facilities in Jakarta and the 
poor economic condition of the Betawi. These challenges have not met 
with a good response from the Betawi because the attitude toward 
education was not supportive. Although awareness of the importance of 
education was increasing, it was still insufficient in the face of 
these challenges. This situation is worse for women since early 
marriage is still considered important, more important for many than 
education.
Undoubtedly education improves the position of women since 
education equips women with the knowledge and expertise necessary to 
play many modern roles and thereby enables them to hold favourable 
positions vis a vis men. It seems however that education as a means 
of improving the position of women had not advanced very far for the 
Betawi since few of them, even the youngest, had been to senior 
secondary school and none had received tertiary education. Many of 
those who did attend school went to religious schools and so it cannot
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be expected that their education has played a role in changing their 
position because they did not receive the knowledge necessary to play 
many modern roles.
If employment as postulated by many authors, can bring a radical 
change in the position of women, then the Betawi women gain very 
little advantage from this process since opportunities to work in 
Jakarta, their limited skills and the attitude toward working women 
have never give them a chance.
Even though there is a new marriage law which is an attempt to 
improve the position of women, it seems that this law may not achieve 
its aims since in effect it offers women the option of being divorced 
or accepting polygyny, although theoretically it makes both divorce 
and polygyny more difficult. Despite this attempt to improve the 
legal situation, the proportion of the Betawi who said that divorce 
was normal and polygyny was good has not changed across generations. 
Finally, extreme changes can hardly be expected since the conventional 
image of men as provider and superior and women as dependant and 
reproducer still exists.
VI. J) Interpretations of findings
Contrary to what might be expected, it seems that for the Betawi 
women there is not a direct correlation between the stage of economic 
development or industrialization and the degree of attainment of 
higher education for women. Development has not improved the economic
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level of the Betawi and this is one of the most important aspects of 
access to education.
Even though many authors have argued that the religious factor is 
the reason for the backwardness of education of Muslim women, this 
argument is not strongly supported by this research, since more highly 
religious respondents were more likely to have a liberal attitude 
toward education. This must be interpreted cautiously, however, since 
the indicator used to measure religious intensity in this research was 
imperfect. A better measure may have led to a different conclusion. 
It is noteworthy that in other studies of this type, most authors have 
emphasized the role of different religions but it seems that religious 
intensity may be a better measurement than differences in religion 
since there are associations between religion and other factors, for 
example, education.
Improvement in education has so far not guaranteed advances in 
employment and marriage behaviour since improved education has not 
affected attitudes to employment and marriage. However, future 
educational improvement among the Betawi women could possibly lead to 
conflict in the attempt to reconcile the self image of men as the 
dominant authority to womens' emerging self image as an equal.
It was shown that there was no relation between the level of 
economic development or the degree of industrialization and women's 
economic participation. Women’s economic opportunities appear to be 
related to a variety of factors, particularly cultural values relating 
to the sexual division of labour and educational opportunities for
wornen.
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Although there has been a controversy as to whether polygyny
lowers or raises the position of women, this research seems to show 
that polygyny has lowered the position of women since it is against 
their wish and puts them into an unfavourable situation.
Thus, this study implies that urbanization, industrialization and 
westernization in Jakarta have not automatically improved the position 
of women as postulated by many authors. These social changes can 
improve the position of women if they lead to better education which 
in turn changes the attitudes of the members of the society. Thus, it 
is understandable that westernization and modernization which are 
usually claimed as factors improving the position of women were
regarded as a bad thing by the society since these factors have not 
yet changed attitudes through education. No conclusion can be drawn 
as to whether the participation of women in the labour force can
improve the position of women, since very few of the Betawi women
worked outside the family circle.
The research findings also imply that as long as social change 
does not impinge male honour, men are more likely to have a liberal 
attitude, but if the traditional role relations in a family are
threatened then men tend to have a conservative attitude. Hence, men 
want to maintain the traditional situation where the man is the
provider and the superior and the women is the dependant, while women 
would prefer their position to be better. But both men and women
acknowledged male power in the household, a situation considered ideal 
by the men. Based on this we can abstract that there are at least
three stages in the improvement of the position of women : first,
women must be conscious of their low position; second, they must be
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prepared to state what they think; third, they must act to change 
their position. The Betawi women are still in the first stage. Their 
limited access to the activities of a modern urban society, poor 
education both in the formal and informal sectors, and their economic 
dependency have put them in this position.
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